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ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE GREEK IN THE COINING OF GOTHIC COMPOUNDS

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Every student of Gothic, who has compared the text of Ulfilas with the Greek of the New Testament, must have observed the marked similarity between the two versions. Ulfilas held himself very closely to the Greek text,[1] as if he feared that any deviation might mean the loss of something sacred. And yet, in spite of this fear of deviation, he has not allowed his Gothic to suffer violence, but, on the contrary, he handles it with an artistic freedom which in places increases to poetic rythm.

He has labored, not only as one summoning up all his keenness and painstaking care, but as a pious Christian who has had a sacred task placed in his hands, a duty which meant more than temporal happiness. In this respect, one can not but compare him with our great Luther. And, although he seems to have misunderstood the meaning of the Greek in a few places, he shows himself even superior to Luther in his rendering of the Epistles to the Corinthians.

His work compares favorably with that of the Latin translator, and is far superior to that of the Old English translators. Ulfilas borrowed fewer words than the others did, preferring to coin words out of Gothic elements, where the other translators were satisfied with mere borrowing. It is remarkable that a man in the fourth century should have been able to do so well in translating the perfect idiom of the Greek into the language of a wandering, war-like tribe. That their language could serve the translator so well points very evidently to a considerable culture among the Goths. And one is willing to give full credence to

[1] As has been shown quite conclusively by C. Marold, *Kritische Untersuchungen über den Einfluss des Lateinischen auf die gotische Bibelübersetzung*, who says, that, although Ulfilas followed the Greek closely, he also used the Latin in the most difficult epistles.

the Latin writers, who tell of war songs, burial songs, New Year songs, and the like, which were often sung to the lute. The Goths were said to be the wisest of all the barbarians and the most similiar to the Greeks.

Now, when we consider that Ulfilas accomplished the task of rendering a new and strange message, couched in a highly developed idiom—an idiom in which the culture and refinement of antiquity have been handed down to us,—and when we consider further that the creation of even an alphabet was necessary before the accomplishment of this work, we begin to realize the magnitude of the task he had undertaken. In the translation of the New Testament, he necessarily met terms descriptive of new officers, offices, institutions, rites and ceremonies, conceptions of duty, of man's relation to God and to his fellow man, which were new to the Goths, and for which it would seem they had no expressions.

The purpose of the present investigation is to determine, as nearly as possible, the extent to which the form of the Greek determined Gothic equivalents; in other words, what compounds Ulfilas coined out of Gothic elements to reproduce the force of the Greek original, and, incidentally, to enable us to realize the pliability and adaptability of the Gothic tongue, when made to reproduce sentiments and ideas to which the Goths must necessarily have been strangers.

As to whether the Gothic language could or could not have had a given expression uninfluenced by the Greek is, in some instances, a matter of personal judgment, a question of how much we wish to concede to the Goths, in the absence of definite information on many points, in the way of culture, social organization, religion, etc. In all such cases it seemed best to be conservative, not claiming what could not be proved.

The words discussed afford varying degrees of evidence of Greek influence. Some occur but a few times (often only once), and their very form seems to show their coined origin, although they offer no material to prove the coining. Such examples will, of course, appeal to every one. Others offer little material for proof, and their being coined can not be established absolutely. Some, again, offer a great deal of material from

which to draw conclusions, are very regular in their correspondences, and thus are very satisfactory. Still others furnish much material, which, however, shows so many irregularities, that it is often utterly impossible to decide the question for or against the theory of coining. In such cases the possibilities and probabilities have as a rule been given, and the question has been left open, to appeal to the reader, and thus impress upon him the difficulties which were involved.

1. usfilma waírþan=ἐκπλήττομαι. That the phrase usfilma waírþan *be amazed* was made in imitation of the Greek verb ἐκπλήττομαι *be amazed* seemed, at first sight, no more than likely. ἐκπλήττομαι is the passive of ἐκπλήττω< *εκ-πλη γ-ι-ω-, root πληγ-, IE. *plāg *strike*, which appears in the Gothic flōkan *lament, bewail*. *plāg is an extension of *plā, the short quantity of which, *plag, *pla, occurs in Lat. plangō *strike*, and Gr. πλάζω <*πλαγ-ι-ω *strike*. The same *pla+k appears in Lith. plàkti *strike*. Church Slavonic plakati *cry*, and in Gr. πλάξ< *πλακ-ς *plane, flat surface*.

*plāg, plāk, are extensions of *pela or *pel *strike* (Prell. 256)[1] which we find in πέλλα *stone*, OHG. felis, Ger. Fels *cliff, rock*, πάλη<*παλ̯ᾱ *flour, dust*, πέλας adv. *near*, πλάτος *breadth*, πέλανος *sacrificial cake*, παλάμη *palm of the hand*, etc.

This root *pel forms a verb πελεμίζω *swing, shake, quiver, tremble*, and this appears in the Go. us-fil-ma *frightened*, and in the noun us-fil-mei *fright* (Uhl. 169; Prell. 243),[1] and furthermore, in the ON. fālma *tremble*, fēlmta *frightened*, fēlmsfullr fjalmsfullr *filled with fear*, from fālma, falma, all going back to *pel *strike*, Lat. pellō *drive* (?), or Gr. πόλεμος, πτόλεμος *war* (?), (Prell. 243).[1]

Now, if Ulfilas had translated πελ-εμίζω by *filma, and if it occured nowhere else in the Germanic dialects, one might look upon it as a coined expression; but the ON., as we see, uses the root in several expressions of fearing. Besides, πελεμίζω does not occur in the New Testament at all.

It would be preposterous to suppose that Ulfilas was conscious

[1] Prellwitz: *Etym. Wörterb. d. Griech. Sprache.*
Uhlenbeck: *Wörterb. d. Got. Sprache.*

of the fact that πληγ- contained a lengthened and extended form of πελ- Since the ON. uses the root in several expressions of fearing, it seems no more than likely that the Goths also used the root to express surprise. The ON., however, uses no prefix, while the Gothic does not occur without the prefix us-. It, therefore, seems safe to say that the Greek prefix ἐκ-, influenced the use of the Gothic prefix us-, since in the three passages, in which us-filma waírþan occurs, the Greek has ἐκ-πλήττομαι, and in the two passages in which us-filmei *fright* is used, the Greek has ἔκ-στασις. But more than this, us-geisnan *fear* translates ἐξ-ίστημι, ἐκ-θαμβέω, and ἐκ-πλήττομαι eight times, and only twice does Ulfilas use other words (Mt. 7:28, biabridēdun = ἐξε-πλήττοντο, and Mk. 5:42, faúrhteins=ἐκστάσει) to translate compounds with the prefix ἐκ-.

Therefore, it seems safe to say that the connection between the roots πληγ- and fil- is genealogical, used in East and North Germanic, but lost in West Germanic, while us- is used in imitation of the Gr. ἐκ-, as the simple ON. fël-, without prefix, proves.

2. ub lwaúrdjan =κακολογέω. There occurs in Mk. 9:39, ubil-waúrdjan *speak ill of*, which translates the Gr. κακολογῆσαι *speak ill of*. But in I Cor. 5:11, Ulfilas uses ubil-waúrds to translate the adjective λοίδορος *railing*, *abusive*. And furthermore, in Mk. 7:10, occurs ubil-qiȷai, translating κακολογέω. The question is, to what extent was Ulfilas influenced by the Greek in the use of these compounds?

No other Germanic dialect shows a similar compound. We *speak ill* of a person, it is true, and the German uses the form 'übel-reden,' but neither language has a similar compound verb.

If the word was coined for the occasion, why did Ulfilas use *waúrdjan in one case, and qiþan in the other? This shows one of two things; either such words of speaking, with the kind of speech, evil or good, prefixed, were in common use as in the Gr. εὖ-λογέω, κακο-λογέω, Lat. male-dicō, bene-dicō, or else both ubil-waúrdjan and ubil-qiþan were coined in imitation of the corresponding Greek words.

And why did Ulfilas use the adjective form ubil-waúrds to translate λοίδορος, which has nothing to do with ubil-waúrds, but

with the Go. leitils, Eng. *little?* (See Prell, under λοίδορος, *leid, *loid.)[1]

The form *waúrdjan never occurs as a simple verb, but always in the compounds: ubil-waúrdjan, filu-waúrdjan, and-waúrdjan, and the corresponding adjective and noun forms: ubil-waúrds, lausa-waúrds, liugna-waúrds, anda-waúrdi, lausa-waúrdi, ga-waúrdi, and also aglaiti-waúrdei, dwala-waúrdei, lausa-waúrdei, filu-waúrdei, as follows:

Mk. 9:39.....ubil-waúrdjan .....κακο-λογῆσαι.
Mk. 7:10.....ubil-qiþai .....κακο-λογῶν.
I. Cor. 5:11..ubil-waúrds .....λοίδορος.
Mt. 6:7.....filu-waúrdjaiþ .....βαττο-λογ-ήσητε.
Mt. 6:7.....filu-waúrdein .....πολυ-λογ-ία.
Rom. 9:20...and-waúrdjais.....ἀνταποκρινόμενος.
Lu. 2:47.....anda-waúrdjam .....ἀποκρίσεσιν.
Lu. 20:26....anda-waúrdeis .....ἀποκρίσει.
Jo. 19:9.....anda-waúrdi.....ἀπόκρισιν.
Col. 3:8.....aglaiti-waúrdein.....αἰσχρο-λογ-ίαν.
Eph. 5:4.....dwala-waúrdei .....μωρο-λογ-ία.
I. Tim. 4:2..liugna-waúrdē .....ψευδο-λόγ-ων.
I. Tim. 1:6..lausa-waúrdein.....μεταιο-λογ-ίαν.
II. Tim. 2:16.lausa-waúrdja.....κενο-φωνίας.
Tit. 1:10.....lausa-waúrdai.....μεταιο-λόγ-οι.
I. Cor. 15:33.ga-waúrdja.....ὁμιλίαι.
I. Tim. 1:4..ga-baúrþi-waúrdē ...γενεα-λογ-ίαις.

From these examples we can see how widespread the use of -waúrd- was in Gothic compounds; of the seventeen examples, nine have -waúrd-, corresponding to -λογ-, while seven have -waúrd-, translating other Greek words. One has a different Gothic word translating -λογ-, and the latter difference can be increased by citing the use of þiuþjan twelve times to translate εὐλογέω (although used many times to translate other Greek words). Thus we see that it is impossible to deduct any law of correspondences from such discrepancies.

Although *waúrdjan occurs only in compounds in the New Testament, we can not assert positively that the Goths did not use it as a simple verb. It is true we do not have it in Modern

[1]Prellwitz: *Etym. Wörterb. d. Griech. Sprache.*

German, as a simple verb, nor did the Old High German have a *wortōn, a weak verb, meaning 'Worte machen, Reden führen,' except in the compound, spile-wortōn 'Scherzreden führen' (Notker, Ps. 76 : 4), but the Middle High German had worten 'Worte machen, reden, zanken,' as a simple verb. In Old High German, the compound of *wurtjan, *wurten, ant-wurten occurs, meaning *answer*, and the Middle High German ant-würten is the same form (kept as the common verb *answer* in the Modern German antworten, where the umlaut is dropped and vowel "o" used through analogy with the noun Wort).

As the Gothic *waúrdjan, thus the Greek *λογέω never occurs as a simple verb. It is very likely, that if *λογέω as a causative from λόγος occurred, we should also find *waúrdjan translating it. We know that causative verbs in Gothic are formed, not only from verb roots, but also from adjectives and nouns. Ulfilas, although well versed in Greek, was hardly conscious of the causative formation of *λογέω from λογ- the o-grade of λεγ-, for the Greeks themselves hardly were philologists to that extent; and so, if the Goths had the verb *waúrdjan as a simple verb, which the Middle High German, where worten occurs, shows to be not improbable, the other compounds would seem to follow as a matter of course. If they had the verb, it was probably used to indicate a rather formal mode of discourse, similar to the German 'reden' or the English *speak, spake*.

Although *waúrdjan might, then, have occurred as a simple verb, it is still possible that this compound of ubil-waúrdjan may have been coined to translate κακο-λογέω. Unfortunately, the compound occurs only twice, once as a verb, once as an adjective, and this adjective translates not κακο-λογ-, but λοίδορος. Now, since *waúrdjan is a derivative from waúrd, if it occurred as a simple verb, the compound ubil-waúrdjan must have been formed from ubil-waúrds. Therefore, we can only say that, since ubil-waúrdjan translates κακο-λογέω so nicely, and since no such compound occurs in any other Germanic dialect, it may have been coined in imitation of the Greek.

But this still leaves unexplained the fact that λοίδορος is translated by ubil-waúrds, and this would tend to prove that the Goths had the adjective in their vocabulary. Still, Ulfilas knew

that λοίδορος means *speaking ill of*, or *railing at*, and in translating it by ubil-waúrds, really reproduced the thought. Although the root of λοίδορος occurs in the e-grade in the Go. leitils *little*, Ulfilas did not know it, and since the meaning *little* is so far removed from the Greek force of the adjective *speaking ill of*, he could not have used such a compound as *leitil-waúrd to reproduce the meaning of λοίδορος.

It, therefore, seems that the Goths may have had the verb *waúrdjan, that they probably had the adjective ubil-waúrds, which is possible and rather probable, but which can not be proved, since there is so little material from which to draw conclusive evidence.

3. filuwaúrdein=πολυλογία. A discrepancy, similar to the one just discussed in No. 2, occurs in Mt. 6:7, where βαττολογήσητε is translated by filu-waúrdjaiþ, and πολυ-λογίᾳ is reproduced exactly by filu-waúrdein *many-wordedness* or *much-speaking*. Waúrd corresponds to λογ- in both cases, and the only difficulty lies in the first component part of the word. If the Greek had, in the passage, *πολυ-λογέω instead of a compound of βαττο-, there would be no difficulty. But the irregularity is not hard to solve. Ulfilas was familiar enough with the meaning of the Greek verb to know that βαττο-λογέω meant *stammer*, or *repeat the same word or words*, even if he did not feel that the word was onomatopoetic, as in βάρβαρος and βατταρίζειν. The Greek seems to try to explain the verb by using the more transparent noun πολυ-λογία immediately after it, and Ulfilas, finding both forms in the same sentence, used the one which meant the most to him.

If ubilwaúrdjan goes back to ubilwaúrds, filuwaúrdjan must point to a *filuwaúrds, which does not occur, except in the noun form filuwaúrdei. Unfortunately, neither the Greek nor the Gothic uses these words in any other passage, and so our resources are limited: nor can Anglo-Saxon, Old High German, or Middle High German help us. We find the OHG. filusprāhhal *much speaking*, but this translates the Lat. multiloquus, linguosus, and magni-loquus; the adjective filu-sprāhhi translates multi-loquum. The Anglo-Saxon has in this passage

sprecan fela, menig-fealdan sprece, and these, too, translate the Lat. multum loqui.

So far there is nothing to prove that the Gothic words were not coined. We find, however, that the Old Norse uses fjǫl-orþr, fjǫl-meligar *many-worded* quite regularly in this sense. This again might be due to the Latin, but since the words are used in the Edda, they seem to be vernacular. Besides, it is just as possible for the idea to have sprung up among the Norse peoples as among the Latin and Greek nations. Of course, this can be said of the Goths, too, and so, for lack of more material, we can not prove the point one way or the other. In either case, however, the word could not have been inherited from the IE. The correspondence is extremely interesting and seems so much like a coining that it is disappointing not to be able to prove it so.

4. We now come to three words which are much more satisfactory, viz.:

Col. 3 : 8.....aglaiti-waúrdein.....*αἰσχρο-λογίαν.*
Eph. 5 : 4.....dwala-waúrdei .....*μωρο-λογία.*
I. Tim. 4 : 2..liugna-waúrdē .....*ψευδο-λόγων.*

Unfortunately, here, too, the words occur only once each and so do not offer much material from which to draw conclusive evidence ; but the correspondences are so very transparent, that it requires but a glance to see that the Gothic words were made in imitation of the Greek words.

Aglaitei (f) means *unchastity* and occurs in OHG. agaleizī, with the same meaning. Aglaitei translates *ἀσελγεία licentiousness* as does the neuter noun aglaiti. It is derived from agls, adj. *indecent*, which occurs in I. Cor. 11 : 6, and transla es *αἰσχρός*. *αἰσχρός* and *ἀσελγεία* are practically synonymous, and so we find the simple adjective agls translating *αἰσχρός* and the noun aglaitei translating *ἀσελγεία*, but in the compound also *αἰσχρός* (aglaitei-waúrdei=*αἰσχρο-λογία*). Although the OHG. has the noun agleizī, it has no compound with the word wort.

The second compound is equally transparent. *μωρο-λογία* (*μωρός foolish*+**λογία* [λόγος *word*]) is translated by dwala-waúrdei (dwala-*foolish*+*waúrdei [waúrd *word*]). It occurs in no other Germanic dialect, and its origin is self-evident.

The third is no less certainly a coining : liugna-waúrds (liugn

lie + *waúrds) translates ψευδο-λόγος (ψευδο- *false*+λόγος *word*). Since this occurs but once, we must rely entirely upon the transparency of the formation for proof, which seems safe, since the correspondence is so perfect and no Germanic dialect can argue against it.

5. In connection with the last compound might be mentioned five other compounds, in which ψευδο- is reproduced by ga-liug-, liugn-, as follows:

Mt. 7:15. . . . .liugna-praúfētum. . . . ψευδο-προφητῶν.
Mk. 13:22. . . galiuga-christjus . . . . ψευδό-χριστοι.
Mk. 13:22. . . galiuga-praúfēteis. . . .ψευδο-προφῆται.
Mk. 10:19. . . galiuga-weitwōds. . . . ψευδο-μαρτυρήσῃς.
II. Cor. 11:13. galiuga-apaústaúleis .ψευδ-απόστολοι.
II. Cor. 11:26. galiuga-brōþrum . . . . ψευδ-αδέλφοις.

Simply the meaning of galiugachristus, galiugapraúfētus and galiugaapaústaúlus would be sufficient proof for the formation of these words in imitation of the Greek words. The Goths knew nothing of Christ until Christianity had been introduced among them, and so they could not have had a word for *false Christ*, galiugachristus. But finding ψευδο-, which Ulfilas knew meant *false*, *lying* (ψ ῦδος), and having the Gothic word at his command, galiug *lie*, root *liug *false*, Ulfilas reproduced what he found in the Greek word, in his Gothic word galiuga- + the borrowed word christus *Christ*.

The same is true of galiuga-praúfētus *false prophet*, translating a similar ψευδο-προφήτης, and galiuga-apaústaúlus *false apostle*, translating its synonymous model ψευδ-απόστολος.

Galiuga-weitwōds *false witness*, reproducing ψευδο-μαρτυρ-, is also plainly a coined compound. It occurs in Mk. 10:19, Lu. 18:20, and I. Cor. 15:15. Weitwōds *witness* translates the noun μάρτυρος *witness* regularly, and weitwōdjan likewise translates the simple verb μαρτυρέω *bear witness*. The idea expressed in the compound was new to Ulfilas, especially in this sense, and there are no examples, either in Gothic or in any other Germanic dialect, to argue against the coining theory.

Galiuga-brōþar *false brother* reproducing ψευδ-αδελφός is no less transparent, and the only objection that could be raised here is the very common noun brōþar, but entering into this compound

to translate ψευδ-αδελφός, it exhibits a new phase hitherto unknown to the Goths, and therefore probably a new word. That galiuga- was in common use to express the idea of *false* is shown in the use of galiuga-guþ *false god* to translate εἰδωλόθυτος, which means an image sacrificed to, from εἴδωλον *image*, and the root θυ- *sacrifice*. It seems probable that the Goths had no conception of an idol in the sense of a god not a true god, since they worshipped abstract gods, not images, although they had images that were sacred to the gods, and so, when Ulfilas was converted and fully embued with the idea of *one true God*, he thought of the other gods from a Gothic standpoint, i. e., not as images but as false gods, and so used the compound galiuga-guþ *false god* and not a compound corresponding to the Greek εἰδωλόθυτος meaning an *image sacrificed to*.

6. The compound lausa-waúrd *empty talk* occurs three times translating μεταιο-λογ- *idle talk* twice, and κενο-φων- *empty sounding* once. The Greek compounds present no great difficulty, since κενο- and μεταιο- are synonymous, as are φων- and λογ-, and it is interesting to note that Ulfilas treated them as synonymous in reproducing them in Gothic.

But here again the ON. shows a compound laus-orþr, laus-yrþr *perjured*, and laus-yrþe *perjury*, and we find also the AS. los-word *careless speech*. But these may be made in imitation of the Latin vani-loqu-, and so do not necessarily prove that the words were used in the vernacular dialects. But the Old Norse used the compound quite extensively, which seems to show that the idea was a Germanic one. But there is not enough material to prove conclusively the origin of the compound.

7. gaþaúrþiwaúrda = γενεαλογία. In I. Tim. 1:4, occurs gabaúrþi-waúrdē *genealogy* (ga-baúrþ- *birth* + waúrd *word*) translating and reproducing γενεα-λογίαις (γενεά *birth*+λογ- *word*). The Latin text uses genealogiis, which is of course borrowed from the Greek. Ulfilas, instead of borrowing the word, as the Latin translator did, coined a word, using Gothic words which translated the Greek accurately and which would mean more to the Goths than the Greek γενεαλογία *genealogy*. Whether the Goths before this time had a word to express *genealogy* can not be determined from examples, since the word occurs only once

in the Bible remnants. This coining can not prove any more here than the borrowing of the word by the Latin. We know that the Romans traced their ancestry as well as the Greeks, and used the word genus in this sense. The Goths most probably used gabaúrþs *birth* in this sense commonly, as we find in Mk. 7:26 where gabaúrþai translates γένει *descent*, Lat. genere. Gabaúrþs occurs in seven passages, translating forms of γεν-, so the correspondence is quite clear. And so when Ulfilas found the word γενεαλογία, being conscious of the composition γενεά+λογ-, instead of using simply gabaúrþs, as in Mk. 7:26, to translate the simple γένος he added waúrd- to reproduce λογ-.

8. filu....=πολυ-(παν-).... (1.) In Eph. 3:10 filu-faihu *manifold* reproduces πολυ-ποίκιλος *variegated, manifold.* We have here a very interesting correspondence: πολυ- and filu as we know are historically the same word, coming from *pəlu, from the root *pel-, *plē-, in fulls *full*, πίμ-πλη-μι *fill*, etc. ποικ- and faih- also go back to an IE. *peiḱ- *poiḱ-, *piḱ. The Greek uses the suffix -ιλο-, while in Gothic the root without suffix occurs. Faih- *colored, variegated*, is the AS. fāh, fāg, OHG. fēh *variegated*, also the ON. feigr, AS. fæge, OHG. feigi *subject to death* (literally *marked out*). Although πολυ-ποικ- and filu-faih are, then, identical, the Gothic may still have been coined in imitation of the Greek. If the compound had descended historically to the Goths, we should expect to find the suffix -ilo- used in both languages, but it does not occur in Gothic. Nor does faih- anywhere, simple or compound, translate ποικ-. It is very plain, then, that Ulfilas, knowing that πολυποίκιλος meant *variegated*, used filu-+faih- to reproduce the idea, not knowing himself that ποικ- and faih- were genealogical descendants of *poiḱ-.

(2.) A similiar compound of filu occurs in Job. 12:3, where filu-galaubis *very precious* translates πολυ-τίμου with the same meaning. Ga-laufs *valuable*, together with ga-laub-jan *believe*, lubains *hope*, goes back to liufs *dear*. Galaufs would mean what is *dear to one*, therefore *valuable*. In this sense compare the English *dear* as being *loved* or *valuable*, also the German 'teuer' meaning *dear* in both senses. Likewise the Greek -τιμος contains

the root τι- which means *place a value on*, as τίω, τι-μή *cost or worth*, with a secondary meaning *honor*.

What is more, ga-laufs regularly translates τιμή, as:

Rom. 9 : 21...galaubamma.....τιμήν.
Rom. 9 : 21...ungalaubamma.....ἀτιμίαν.
I. Cor. 7 : 23..galaubamma.....τιμῆς.

There is, however, one perplexing discrepancy. In I. Tim. 2: 9, gal(a)ub im[1] occurs as a translation of πολυτελεῖ. The πολυ- has been left apparently untranslated, at least filu- is not used. πολυ-τελής is from πολύς *much*+τέλος *cost*. The fact that Ulfilas does not use filu- in translating the word in this passage seems to show that he had no compound filugalaufs in common use, else he would have used it here. And the use of it to translate πολύτιμος, and its omission in πολυτελής can be explained in the following way. τιμή means *value, worth*, and is reproduced in meaning and strength by galaufs, and so when τιμή was strengthened by πολυ-, Ulfilas felt the need of filu-; but τέλος means *cost*, which is really a secondary meaning, from τέλος *end*, that which is *accomplished*, and the meaning *valuable* would really be tertiary, so galaufs would seem strong enough to reproduce the Greek πολυ-τελής.

(3.) In II. Cor. 11 : 3 and Eph. 4 : 14 filu-deisein *subtlety, cunning* translates πανουργίᾳ *craftiness, cunning* (πᾶν+ἔργον *work*.) Here filu- reproduces not πολυ- as in the two preceding examples, but πᾶν *all*. This difficulty is easily overcome, when one considers the similarity in meaning between *all* and *very*, for example the German in 'es ist ganz weiss' which may mean *it is all (entirely) white* or merely *it is very white*. The correspondence between *-deisei and ἔργον is a little more troublesome, still not obscure. The only connections that *deisei has in Germanic seem to be OHG. itis, idis, dīs, pl. dīsir *the wise women, walküre*, cf. Oskar Schade. Its root is found in Skt. dīdhye *think*, dhīra-*wise*, etc.; Modern Persian dīdan *see*, Albanian dinák *crafty*, which has the same meaning as the Greek and Gothic word. *Deisei in the sense of *think, plan, do*, would then equal ἔργω from *ἐρδω *work*. πανοῦργος *working, doing many kinds of things*,

[1]The text of Balg gives the form "galubaim," while that of Massmann places the "a" in parenthesis and stars the form.

therefore *crafty*, and in an unpleasant sense *crafty, cunning, knavish*. The correspondence is then perfect and the coining evident.

9. gardawaldands=οἰκοδεσπότης. A compound gardawaldands *master of the house* occurs in Mt. 10:25, Lu. 14:21, translating οἰκοδεσπότης, Lat. pater familias. It occurs in I. Tim. 5:14 as a verbal phrase garda waldan *rule the house*, translating the verb οἰκο-δεσποτεῖν. The composition of the compound is simple: gards *house, home*=οἰκία, waldands *ruler* (pres. part. of waldan Ger. walten *rule*) translates δεσπότης *master*. No other Germanic dialect shows such a compound, nor does the Latin, and although the Goths must have had an expression for the father or head of the family, we can not be sure that this was it, nor can we call the compound heiwa-frauja *house lord* the native Gothic compound, with certainty. The latter occurs in Mk. 14:14, and translates οἰκο-δεσπότης also. Heiwa- is from *heiw- *home* and frauja *lord, master*, so the compound is perfectly synonymous with the above garda-waldands, both reproducing οἰκο-δεσπότης perfectly. If they are not both coined in imitation of the Greek it is impossible to say which one was the original Gothic expression for *master of the house*, since both are perfectly synonymous and reproduce the Greek compound member for member. It hardly seems probable that the Goths had two compounds so nearly alike to express one idea, and yet this is not impossible. Therefore, although the words seem to follow the Greek model so faithfully, they might have existed in the Gothic vernacular vocabulary as the phrases to denote the *master* or *lord* or *head of the house*. If we take this view of the case it would tend to show that the Goths felt the same liberty in forming compounds that the Modern German has.

10. synagōgafaþs=ἀρχισυνάγωγος. Some interesting compounds are presented in three words, where the Greek ἀρχ(ι)-*ruling, leading* is translated by -faþs *master*, viz., (1) synagōgafaþs=ἀρχι-συνάγωγος *ruler of a synagogue*, (2) þusundi-faþs=χιλί-αρχος *commander over one thousand men*, (3) hunda-faþs=ἑκατόντ-αρχος *commander over one hundred men*.

(1.) The Goths had no 'συναγωγή' and so quite naturally had no 'ἄρχων' of the 'συναγωγή' or 'ἀρχι-συνάγωγος.' But they had a

-faþs, which occurs only in the above mentioned compounds and one other, brūþ-faþs *bridegroom*. This -faþs goes back to an IE. *pótis, San. páti- *master*, Gr. πόσις *husband*, Lat. potis *able*, all of which are identical with -faþs. It is used as a suffixal element entirely, while ἀρχι)- is used as a suffixal and prefixal element, as the above examples show.

In translating ἀρχισυνάγωγος Ulfilas kept the word -συναγωγ-, but being conscious of the meaning of the prefixed ἀρχι-, used a Gothic element that reproduces the force of ἀρχι-,i. e., the suffix -faþs, in distinction to the Latin, which merely borrowed the form archesynagōgus, in the four passages, in which ἀρχισυνάγωγος occurs.

An interesting variation is the translation of ἀρχι-συνάγωγος by faúramaþleis synagōgais, where Ulfilas, feeling the force of ἀρχι-+ συναγωγ-, departed yet more from the original, but still reproduced the thought perfectly. Faúra- + *maþleis (faúra *before* and maþljan *speak*), i. e., *the one who speaks before the assembly, prince, ruler*. Since faúra-maþleis is clearly not an imitation of the Greek or Latin, it would appear to be the Gothic word for the leader of their assemblies or otherwise, and this might show what the Goths would have said, had the Greek not have been used as a model, while synagōga-faþs shows a compound formed to reproduce the Greek compound ἀρχι-συνάγωγος.

(2.) þūsundi-faþs translates (Mk. 6:21, Jo. 18:12) χιλί-αρχος *commander over one thousand men* (þūsundi=χιλι- *thousand;* -faþs =ἀρχ- *ruler*). The Goths probably had no such commander, and the composition of the Greek word was so evident to Ulfilas that he, again making use of what his language offered him, constructed the intelligible þūsundi-faþs.

(3.) In five passages occurs hunda-faþs, translating and exactly reproducing the Greek ἑκατόντ-αρχος *commander over one hundred men*. The composition here is equally transparent, hund-*hundred*=ἕκατον; the last member being the same as discussed in the preceding examples. But in three passages we find κεντυρίων which is borrowed from the Lat. centuriō. Since Ulfilas was also well versed in Latin, the κεντυρίων, centuriō gave him no difficulty and he treated it exactly like ἑκατόντ-αρχος.

11. gajukō=παραβολή. The correspondence between ga-jukō

and παρα-βολή *parable* is clear. The Gothic ga-juk means a *yoking together*, thus a *placing side by side*, ga- having, as most commonly, a collective force, and juk *yoke*, Gr. ζυγόν, Lat. jugum, Skt. yugá- from *jeug-, *joug-, *jug-. παρά means here, as often, *beside* and -βολη is from βάλλω *throw*, therefore, *a throwing or placing along side of something*, and is reproduced exactly by ga-juk-ō. This alone makes the coining seem probable, and if we stop to think how new the idea must have been to Ulfilas, we feel that the word was surely coined in this sense. One can hardly imagine the Goths expressing things in parables. We know, what is more, how little figure of speech had developed even in the Middle High German period, nothing but the crudest similes, though beautiful, occurring, and that, too, rarely.

παρα-βολή meaning *parable* is secondary, the primary meaning a *joining or collection*. Likewise the Go. ga-jukō means primarily *something joined*, as gajuk *pair*, gajuka, with the corresponding feminine gajukō *companion*, translating forms of ζευγ-; Lu. 2: 24; gajuk = ζεῦγος; II. Cor. 6: 14, gajukans = ἑτερο-ζυγοῦντες; Phil. 4: 3, gajukō = σύνζυγε.

Ulfilas does not seem to have been quite clear as to the meaning in the sense of *parable*, since we find gajukō translating also παρ-οιμία (παρά *aside, apart* + οἶμος *way*, i. e., *a saying out of the usual course*, or, *deviating from the usual manner of speaking*, or, *proverb*). It is true that the meaning of parable and proverb is not so very different, since a parable, repeated, could easily pass into a proverb, and we actually find this development in Greek. Still the Latin borrows *parabola* to translate παραβολή, but uses *proverbium* to translate παροιμία, which shows that a difference was felt by the Romans. On the other hand, both ideas were new to the Goths, and Ulfilas found that gajukō meant both παραβολή and παροιμία to him.

12. βλασφημία. This word *blasphemy* and the verb βλασφημέω *blaspheme* show quite a varied treatment. βλασ- is from βλάξ *sluggish, stupid*, which in the verb form βλάπτω means *hurt, harm, injure*. *φημία is from φήμη *speech*. βλασ-φημ- is, then, *railing, slander, speech injurious to another's good name*.

There occurs also twice, I. Cor. 4: 13, II. Cor. 6: 8, δυσ-φημ-, of which only the latter example is extant in the Gothic rem-

nants. δυσ- is an inseparable prefix conveying the idea of *difficulty, opposition, injuriousness* or the like, so δυσ-φημ- is practically synonymous with βλασ-φημ-.

Of eighteen passages, where βλασ-φημ- occurs, three are translated by (1) naiteins *blasphemy*, thirteen by (2) waja-mēr- *blaspheme*, and three by (3)ana-qiþ- *slander, blaspheme.*

(1.) Naiteins=nait-+Germanic suffix -ī-ni, AS. nǣtan, OHG. neizzan *torment, trouble*, Lett. naids *hate*, nīdu *hate*, Gr. ὄνειδος *reproach*, Skt. níd-, nídā, *insult, disgrace.*

(2.) Waja-mēr-eins *blasphemy;* waja-mēr-jan *blaspheme.* Wai =*woe*, AS. wā,OHG. wē, Lat. vae: -mērjan *announce*, OHG. māri, Gr. -μωρος in ἐγχεσίμωρος *famous with the spear*, from *mē-, *mō-.

(3.) Ana-qiþan, ana-qiss, *blaspheme, blasphemy*, ana=*upon, against*, Gr. ἀνά: qiþan *say*, AS. cweþan, as in bequeath, OHG. quëdan.

βλασ-φημ- is practically reproduced in parts and meaning by waja-mēr- and ana-qiþ-, but only in meaning by naiteins. All the words cited mean primarily only *speak ill of*, or *slander*, and in the sense of *blaspheme* have a secondary, added force.

Although naiteins translates βλασφημία, it undoubtedly has a secondary, new meaning with this force, and was a Gothic word meaning *slander, plague*, as the OHG. neizzan, neizan, Old-Middle High German neizen in geneizen, with the same meaning shows, pointing to a Gothic *naitjan *plague, treat shamefully*, going back to the older languages, where it has also the same meaning of *hate, insult* (see above). It looks, then, as if this had been the Goths' word for *slander, insult*, and is used by Ulfilas three times to translate βλασ-φημ-, and in these passages has an added, new force.

Ana-qiþ reproduces the Greek faithfully, but savors so much of the Gothic 'Sprachgefühl' that it seems like a Gothic word, and this is shown by its use. In two of the three passages, in which it occurs, it means not *blasphemy* but as follows, I. Tim. 6:4 ana-qiss-eis, translates βλασ-φημ-ίαι, meaning *railings;* I. Cor. 10:30, ana-qiþ-aidau translates βλασ-φημ-οῦμαι *evilly spoken of*, and in the third passage, Col. 3:8, ana-qiss translates βλασ-φημ-ίαν *blasphemy*, although the name of the Deity is not used in connection with it.

Now, in the twelve cases where waja-mēr- translates βλασ-φημ- it clearly means *blasphemy* against God.

Therefore, it may be concluded that naiteins, on account of its independent form and general meaning, is a Gothic word, and that ana-qiþ, although reproducing the Greek model quite well, too, on account of its meaning and use, may not be coined to express the idea of *blasphemy*, but is probably a Gothic word used in a more general sense.

But waja-mēr-, which reproduces the Greek model, not only in form and detail, but also in meaning, was coined by Ulfilas, waja- to equal βλασ- from βλάξ, -mērjan to equal -φημεω. Mērjan occurs eleven times as a simple verb, and never translates any compound of -φημ-, but always the simple verb κηρύσσω *announce*. The use of waja-mērjan would compare nicely, then, with the use of *waúrdjan as a more formal, discourse or announcing. cf. No. 2 *waúrdjan.

The use of waja-mēr- once, to translate δυσ-φημ- *defamed, evil report*, does not necessarily argue against this theory. It is true that in this case there is not the idea of *blasphemy*, and if my theory is correct, we might expect to find ana-qiþ- in this passage, but it is used here in the couplet, *by bad report and by good report*, διὰ δυσφημίας καὶ εὐφημίας, and since εὐ-φημ- is regularly translated by waila-mēr-, as the following set of words discussed will show (No. 13), it naturally influenced the use of -mēr-, with waja- to express its opposite.

13. A correspondence, similar to the preceding, is shown in the translation of the word of opposite meaning, *bringing good tidings*. The correspondences are best shown in tabular form, as follows:

Lu. 9:6	waila-mēr-jandans — εὐ-αγγελ-ιζόμενοι.
Lu. 16:16	waila-mēr-jada: — εὐ-αγγελ-ίζεται
Eph. 3:8	waila-mēr-jan — εὐ-αγγελ-ίσασθαι
Lu. 4:18	waila-mer-jan — εὐ-αγγελ-ίσασθαι
Lu. 1:19	waila-mēr-jan — εὐ-αγγελ-ίσασθαι
Lu. 4:43	waila-mēr-jan — εὐ-αγγελ-ίσασθαι
Lu. 3:18	þiuþ-spill-ōda — εὐ-ηγγελ-ίζετο
Lu. 8:1	waila-spill-ōnds — εὐ-αγγελ-ιζόμενος
II. Cor. 9:5	waila-qiss — εὐ-λογ-ίαν

I. Cor. 10:16. þiuþ-i-qiss-ais.....εὐ-λογ-ίας
7 times....þiuþ-jan.....εὐ-λογ-έω
2 times....þiuþ-idō.....εὐ-λογ-ημένη
2 times....þiuþ-iþs.....εὐ-λογ-ητός
2 times....þiuþ.....εὐ-λογ-
3 times....ga-þiuþ.....εὐ-λογ-
9 times....aiw-aggēl.....εὐ-αγγελ-
2 times....waila-mēr-.....εὐ-φημ-
I. Cor. 1:21.. waila-mēr-einais....κηρύγματος
II. Cor. 1:19. mēr-jada, as often ..κηρυχθείς
mēr-iþa=ἀκοή, φήμη, but never (εὐ)-αγγελ-

Here again we expect to find Gothic words which belonged to the homogeneous vocabulary, meaning *speak good*, etc., and the forms of þiuþ *good* seem to be such words. þiuþ occurs in the denominative verb form þiuþ-jan *bless*, seven times, to translate εὐ-λογ-έω *invoke blessings*, and in nine passages in various forms, all of which translate εὐ-λογ-. þiuþ- *good*, translates εὐ- *good*, but there is no coining here, since we should, in that case, need an equivalent for -λογ-, as we find in ubil-waúrd-=κακο-λογ-, and in filu-waúrd-=πολυ-λογ-.

The simple verb mēr-jan occurs often, but always translates κηρύσσω *announce*, and the other words with the root mēr- translate ἀκοή, φήμη, etc., but never the compound εὐ-αγγελ-, or the simple ἀγγελ-. Likewise ἀγαθωσύνης is translated by þiuþ-ein-ais, II. Thess. 1:11; and in Lu. 1:29, þiuþ-ida translates ἀσπασμός *salutation*, where there can be no coining, but merely a reproduction of thought.

That we should find εὐ-αγγελ- borrowed in the form aíw-aggēl-, beside the coined words is not at all remarkable. The Latin and Anglo-Saxon show a similar use of borrowing and coining, side by side. In Anglo-Saxon god-spell occurs only a few times, and yet is the common *gospel* of the present day, used as the equal of the *evangel* borrowed from the Greek, through the Latin. cf. also the borrowing of συναγωγή by the side of the form gaqumþs, No. 35.

Waila-mēr-i, Phil. 4:8, translating εὔ-φημ-α *of good report*, and waila-mēr-ein, II. Cor. 6:8, translating εὐ-φημ-ίας, are evidently coined expressions. Waila *good*, reproduces εὐ- *good*, while mēr-eins *preaching* and φήμη, *a prophetic voice* would also correspond.

It is slightly irregular that waila-mēr-einais should translate κηρύγ-ματος. Here it looks very much as if the theory calling waila-mēr- a coining would not hold good, yet, taking into consideration that all other cases of waila-mēr- translate compounds of εὐ-, and that κῆρυξ in one form or the other is translated regularly and in about twenty passages by the simple -mēr- forms, this one exception does not bear much testimony against my assumption. For Ulfilas felt the force of *announcing* or *proclaiming* in κηρύγματος and having used the word waila-mēr- so often, might have wanted that force in this passage, to express his interpretation of the Greek.

The other compounds give less trouble. We find εὐ-αγγελίζω translated six times by waila-mēr-jan, once by þiuþ-spill-, and once by waila-spill-.

εὐ- *well-*+ἀγγελ-ίζω *announce* from ἀγγέλω is reproduced well by the Gothic compounds used to translate it. Waila AS. wel, OHG. wëla, wola, Ger. wol *well;* for mēr-jan see preceding discussion, waja-mēr-jan. Spill-ōn *announce*, AS. spellian, OHG. spëllōn, thus waila-spill-ōn would be synonymous with both the preceding words, and all three, waila-mērjan, waila-spillōn, þiuþ-spillōn, would fall under one head in treatment, being perfectly synonymous.

We now come to waila-qiss, II. Cor. 9: 5, and þiuþ-i-qiss-ais, I. Cor. 10: 16, *blessing* both translating εὐ-λογ-ία *blessing*. Here, again εὐ is well represented in þiuþ, and waila, and qiþ-an *speak* represents φημί *speak* and the fact that -qiss and not mēr- is used to reproduce λογ- argues for the influence of the Greek form on the choice of Gothic words.

From these cases, then, it would seem just to consider waila-mēr-, waila-spill-, þiuþ-spill-, waila-qiss, þiuþ-i-qiss, coined compounds, formed in imitation of the Greek εὐ-αγγελ-, εὐ-λογ-, εὐ-φημ-.

The verbs waila-mēr-jan and þiuþ-spillōn or waila-spillōn would, then, be used as waja-mērjan and filu-waúrdjan or ubil-waúrdjan in a formal mode of discourse.

14. bimaitan=περιτέμνω. περι-τέμνω *circumcise*, περι-τομή *circumcision* are without exception translated by bi-mait-an and bi-mait. The correspondence is very plain. περί *about, around*,

reproduced by bi *about* always translated by the Latin circum; τέμνω *cut* being reproduced by the Gothic maitan *cut*, Latin cidō. Not only is it perfectly plain that the Latin and Gothic words are made in imitation of the Greek, but we know that the rite of circumcision was not practiced by the Northern tribes, and its introduction was, therefore, caused by contact with the Southern nations, and this undoubtedly was the first Germanic attempt to use the term in literature. The coining, is, therefore, most certain.

In Phil. 3: 2, κατα-τομ-ήν, Lat. con-cis-ionem, is translated by ga-mait-anōn. Ulfilas was undoubtedly conscious of the collective idea in κατα-τομ-ήν *mutilation*, and has well rendered it in ga-mait-.

Although Ulfilas had to coin a word bi-mait, to translate περι-τομή, he did not feel the need of forming any word to equal ἀκροβυστία, the condition of uncircumcision, but merely prefixed un-, and thus expressed the opposite of περι-τομή. However, in I. Cor. 7: 18, ἐπι-σπάσθω *become uncircumcised*, i. e., *stretch out the foreskin*, called forth an attempt in the form of uf-rak-jai *stretch out*, and ἐν ἀκροβυστίᾳ is translated by miþ faúrafillj ι.

15. ufargudja=ἀρχιερεύς. The equivalents of the word for *high priest* ἀρχιερεύς present some interesting features. ἱερεύς *priest* is regularly translated by gudja (stem of guþ *god*+suffix -ja-), and this seems to be the regular Gothic word for priest, and was in all probabilities used for their heathen priests.

In the first place, we find the Greek ἀρχιερεύς (ἀρχ- *chief, leading* + ἱερεύς *priest*) translated by the simple gudja *priest*, with evidently the force of *high priest*. Otherwise, there is an attempt at reproducing ἀρχ- *high*, as follows:

Mk. 10: 33 . . . ufar-gudjam . . . . . ἀρχ-ιερεῦσιν
Mk. 11: 18 . . . gudjanē aúhmistans . . . ἀρχ-ιερεῖς
Jo. 18 13 . . . aúhmists weiha . . . . . ἀρχ-ιερεύς
Jo. 18: 26 . . . maistīns gudjins . . . . . ἀρχ-ιερέως
Jo. 19: 6 . . . maistans gudjans . . . . . ἀρχ-ιερεῖς
Jo. 18: 22 . . . reikistin gudjin . . . . . ἀρχ-ιερεῖ

All five of the Gothic compounds reproduce the force of the Greek model; ufar *over*, aúhmists *highest* superlative, with a parallel aúhuma (superlative form, used in comparative sense),

maists *most, greatest*, superlative of maiza *more;* and reikists *mightiest*, superlative of reiks *mighty, noble*, the second component part gudja *priest* being the same in all cases, with the exception of Jo. 18: 13, aúhmists weiha. This seems to be the only time that weiha occurs. It is made from the stem of weihs adj. *holy*, and does not seem to be a common word for priest.

Now, it is impossible to determine which of these words were used by the Goths to denote the high priest of their own religion, if they had such officers. The use of the simple gudja to translate ἀρχιερεύς seems to point to the fact that this word meant high priest as well as simply priest, and slipped in at a time during the translation when Ulfilas was paying attention, more to meaning and less to form. And this seems the more likely, since the three examples of the discrepancy occur in the same chapter, Mt. 27: 1,3,6.

It does not seem possible that the Goths should have had five expressions for *high priest*. They all are imitations aad show a conscious effort to reproduce the Greek model. What is more, the AS. version shows a similar coining in aldermǫnn sacerdos, aldor-sacerdos, using, after the Latin, also bisceop, bisceop ƀēow. These forms all go to suggest the novelty of the idea to the Germanic mind.

16. In Jo. 18: 30, ubil-tōjis *evil-doing* translates the Greek κακο-ποιός (κακο- *evil* + -ποιος *doing*), and in II. Tim. 2:9, the same Gothic word translates κακοῦργος (κακο- + *ἐργος from ἔργω, *ἔρδω *do, work*).

The correspondence between the Gothic and the Greek words is perfect, ἐργ- and ποι- being synonymous, and it seems very evident that Ulfilas coined the Gothic words in imitation of the Greek words. Now, the Goths must have had a word or words to express the idea of *doing-evil*, the idea is so common and matter-of-fact. The English has evil-doer, evil-deed, the German likewise shows Übelthat, Übelthäter, etc. Of course the Latin too, had malefactor, but it can not be that the only source of the Germanic words should be the influence of the older nations. We are all of one common tribe, and we know that the idea of 'evil- or well-doing' must have existed from the time man began

to develop individuality. Then, how far was the Greek model taken in forming these words?

We find the Gothic word wai-dēdja *evil-doer* literally *woe-doer* used regularly as the word for one who does wrong, translating the Gr. λῃστης, therefore independent of the Greek in form, allied only in meaning. The common word for *evil-deed* is missa-dēþs, i. e., *missed deed, a deed that did not succeed.* These two words show, very likely, the original Gothic words used in this sense, and in the two cases where ubil-tōjis occurs, Ulfilas tried to reproduce the Greek. The words show this conscious effort, at least, whether coined or not.

17. In Jo. 8:44, mana-maúrþrja *man-murder* translates ἀνθρωποκτόνος (ἄνθρωπος *man* +*κτονος from κτείνω *kill*). The word occurs only in this one passage and *maúrþrja does not occur at all. Nor do we find any other compound of manna in this sense. The word maúrþr *murder* translates φόνος and maúrþrjan *to murder* translates φονεύω stem φον- in both cases. In I. Tim. 1:9, occurs maúrþrjandam, however translating ἀνδροφόνοις. It seems probable that, if the Goths had had a word compounded with manna meaning *murder*, Ulfilas would have used it here. But he uses the common word murder, since that is the meaning of the Greek, in spite of the occurrence of ἀνδρο-, in the compound. We have a word man-slaughter, it is true, but no man-murder, which would be a needless repetition.

18. ananiujan=ἀνακαινόω. In Rom. 12:2, ana-niujiþai translates ἀνα-καινώσει *renewal.* Ana=Gr. ἀνά; niujis=καινός *new*, and in II. Cor. 4:16, the verb ἀνα-καινοῦται *make new, renew*, is translated by ana-niujada, while in Col. 3:10, the same Greek verb is translated without prefix. This is not so very irregular, since the ἀνα does not seem to have any special force in the compound, and the fact that Ulfilas uses it three times out of four shows that the form of the Greek word influenced the form of the Gothic word.[1] In Eph. 4:23, ana-niujaiþ translates ἀνανεοῦσθαι, which is quite regular, since καινός *new*, and νεός *young*, are practically synonymous. Jo. 10:22 shows in-niujiþa trans-

[1] Especially since the 'Notfeuer' was used among the early Germanic tribes for cleansing, would the abstract idea of the rite call forth a coined compound in imitation of the Greek.

lating ἐγ-καίνια *dedication;* in=ἐν and the second member as above. This is an annual festival, celebrating the cleansing of the temple from the pollutions of Antiochus Epiphanes, and so was probably a new idea to the Goths; but Ulfilas had no trouble in making a word for it, since the Greek is so transparent.

19. aljaleikōs laisjan = ἑτερο-διδασκαλέω. In I. Tim. 6:3, occurs the phrase aljaleikōs laisjai, which translates the Greek ἑτερο-διδασκαλεῖ *heterodoxy*, ἕτερος *other*, and διδασκαλός *teaching;* aljaleikōs adv. *otherwise*, laisja *teaching*. In I. Tim. 1:3, occurs a cognate expression, anþarleikō laisjana, which would correspond equally well.

That the Goths had no such thing as heterodoxy, before Christianity was introduced among them, is quite evident, and so the compounds may well be looked upon as coined expressions from a historical standpoint as well as from their linguistic resemblances.[1]

20. aljaleikōn=ἀλληγορέω. In Gal. 4:24, Ulfilas translates ἀλληγορούμενα by alja-leikōþ *allegorical*. The first member ἀλλο- and alja- *other* correspond perfectly, but the second members differ. The Greek has ἀγορέω *speak* the compound, meaning, then, *speak otherwise* or *allegorically*, while the second member in Gothic is a past participle from a verb which does not occur, *leikōn from *leiks *like*. *Leikōn would mean *to liken*, and the compound means, therefore, *to liken to other things*. The meaning of the two compounds is similar, then, although not identical, and it is quite evident that the Gothic form is coined in imitation of the Greek, since no such compound occurs in any other Germanic dialect. We ourselves borrow the word *allegory*. It hardly seems probable that the Goths had such figures of speech as *allegories*, the idea must have been new to them, and Ulfilas has expressed it in this way.

21. aglaitgastalds=ἀισχροκερδή. In I. Tim 3:8, and Tit. 1:7, aglait-gastalds translates ἀισχρο-κερδή *greedy of filthy lucre*. For etymology and correspondences of aglait-, cf. No. 4, aglaiti-

[1] Although there are evidences of a falling away from the gods, among the early Germans, the nature of the conception would be so entirely different from that of the Christians that the linguistic resemblances may well show a coining.

waúrds, *Gastalds from gastaldan *win, gain*=*κερδη from κέρδος from κερδαίνω *gain, acquire*, the coining is so evident here, and since there are no examples, either in Gothic or any other dialect, to argue against it, we can safely call the Gothic compound made for the occasion, in imitation of the Greek model.

22. handuwaúrhts = χειροποίητος. In Mk. 14:58, and Eph. 2:11, handu-waúrhts translates χειρο-ποίητος *made by hand*, the negative of which, unhandu-waúrhts translating ἀ χειρο-ποίητος occurs in Mk. 14·58, and II. Cor. 5:1. The correspondence between the parts is very clear; handu-=χειρο- *hand*, and -waúrhts =-ποιητος from ποιέω *make*, waúrhts from waúrkjan *work*, and in the negative compound un- again translates the alpha-privative.

The forms are so very transparent that it would seem as if there could be no doubt as to the Gothic being a coining in imitation of the Greek: and yet there appear in the oldest AS. version, both hand-worht and un-hand-worht, while the Latin has manu factum and non manu factum.

23. unqēniþs=ἄγαμος. The common verb *marry* in Gothic is liugan and translates the Gr. γαμέω. There is also an expression liugōm hafts *having marriage, wedded*, which translates the same γαμ-. The adjective ἄ-γαμος (ἀ- alpha-privative *not* and γάμος *wedding festival*) is translated quite regularly in I. Cor. 7:11, by un-liugaiþs, un- the negative prefix reproducing alpha-privative and liug- (past participle) translating γάμος.

There is, however, in I. Cor. 7:8, the form un-qēnidam translating ἀγάμοις. *Qēn-iþs is a past participle from a verb *qēnjan, made from qēns *wife*, *qēnjan would mean *marry, take a wife*, and the past participle *married, having taken a wife*, un-qēn-iþs would mean *not having taken a wife*, i. e., *not having taken part in a wedding ceremony*, and would, then, translate ἄ-γαμος. Since neither the past participle *qēniþs nor the verb *qēnjan occurs, we cannot prove that such a verb form actually existed, and it looks, therefore, as if un-qēn-iþs were a form, coined in imitation of the Greek ἄ-γαμος. For in thirteen passages where expressions of marriage occur, forms of liug- are used, but no form of the verb *qēnjan with this one exception, and it seems likely that, if the Goths had had such a verb, it would have appeared somewhere in these thirteen passages.

24. unsibjis=ἄνομος. A very interesting compound occurs in Mt. 7:23, where un-sib-jana is used to translate *ἀ-νομίαν iniquity*, and in Mk. 15:28, where un-sib-jaim translates *ἀ-νόμ-ων impious*, and a third in I. Tim. 1:9, where un-sib-jaim translates *ἀ-σέβ-εσιν lawless*. In all three cases the Greek alpha-privative is reproduced by the Gothic prefix un-, but if the word was coined, why did Ulfilas use *sib-jis, sib-ja to translate *νόμος*, **νομία*? Sib-ja means *relationship*, not *law*, and occurs in Gal. 4:5, in the phrase suniwē sibja *the adoption of sons*. Sib-ja in the sense of relationship occurs in the OHG. sippa, MHG. sippe, Ger. Sippe, *kin, relatives, class*. Since the Goths had the noun sib-ja *relationship*, applying to those who cherish one another, it seems probable that they also had an expression un-sib-ja, showing a breach of this family tie or *iniquity* which translates *ἀ-νομ-ία iniquity* Mt. 7:23. And since they had a noun sib-ja *relationship*, they most probably had an adjective *sib-jis. This seems the more likely, since the form is used also to translate *ἀ-σεβ-ής*, and sib-ja does not mean *law* (*νόμος*), but *relationship*. If the word had been coined, we should expect to find, not sib-jis, but witōþs, used in the compound, as we do find in I. Cor. 9:21, where in-witōþs reproduces exactly the Gr. *ἔν-νομος subject to*, or *within the law*. Evidently here Ulfilas was attracted by the form of the Greek word, and did not use his Gothic form with *sib-jis, but reproduced *νόμος* by witōþs, *law*, prefixing in- to reproduce *ἐν-*, which compound occurs nowhere else. We likewise find, in I. Tim. 1:9, witōda-lausaim translating *ἀ-νόμοις*, and in I. Cor. 9:21, witōda-laus- translates *ἀ-νομ-* three times. These Gothic words may well be looked upon as native words, since to show Greek influence they would have to appear in the form *un-witōþs, perhaps, as in-witōþs reproduces *ἔν-νομος*. Besides, we also find in I. Cor. 9:21, witōdis laus, not as a compound, but laus as an adjective governing the gen. of witōþs, the regular Gothic construction.

We can thus conclude, that since sib-ja, un-sib-ja, and un-sib-jis occur, there was also a *sib-jis, and although the negative prefixes correspond so nicely, the Goths probably had these negative compounds also, in common use. But in the case of in-witōþs=*ἔν-νομ-ος*, we have a coined compound, since witōþs

translates *νόμος law*, and in- reproduces *ἐν-*. Of course witōþs is the common word for *law* translating *νόμος*, but the compound in-witōþs does not occur in any other Germanic dialect, nor does the Latin reproduce the Greek, as a compound, and so, on account of the Greek aspect of *ἔν-νομ-ος*, it seems most probable that the Gothic compound is a coining. cf. for such compounds, peculiar to the Greek *ἀλληγορέω*, No. 20; *αἰσχρο-κερδή*, No. 21; *ὕπ-ανδρος* No. 29, etc.

Another compound of witōþs, witōda-laisareis, occurs in Lu. 5: 17, and I. Tim. 1: 7, where witōda-laisarjōs translates *νομοδιδάσκαλοι*: witōd-=*νομ-*, laisareis=*διδάσκαλος teacher*, which is very plainly a coining.

25. anakunnan=*ἀναγιγνώσκω*. In II. Cor. 1: 13, 3: 2, the verb *ἀνα-γιγνώσκω read* is translated by the Go. ana-kunnan; and in II. Cor. 3: 14, ana-kunnainai *a reading*, translates *ἀναγνώσει*. In all other cases the Greek words *ἀνα-γνω-*, *ἀνα-γιγνω-* are translated by siggwan, ussigwan (identical with the Eng. *sing*.) We find that the Gr. *ᾄδοντες*, Col. 3: 16, is translated by siggwandans and *ψάλλοντες*, Eph. 5: 19, *singing to the lute* is also translated by siggwandans.

That the idea *read* should be expressed three times by ana-kunn-, and in all other cases by siggw- is striking, especially since all three cases of ana-kunn- are found in II. Cor. The correspondence between the Greek and the Gothic is plain, *ἀνα-*= ana-, *γιγνώσκω*=kunnan. Of course these verbs are themselves related, both going back to *gen, *gon, *gn̥, and *gnē, *gnō. Yet in such a verb form the Gothic can not be the descendant of the form found in the Greek, since the verb has undergone a peculiar treatment in Gothic. *Kunnan is a derivative from kunnan *know, recognize*, the preterit-present verb, and makes these parts, *kunnan, *kunnaida, *kunnaiþs, being used only in compounds.

No other Germanic dialect shows such a compound meaning *read*, and its rare occurrence, alongside the usual siggwan, would point to a coining. The fact that it occurs only in II. Cor. may also point to the work of another translator. What is more, ana used independently does not have the force of the Greek *ἀνά* in the sense of *again*, and in compounds only in ana-niujan translating *ἀνα-καινόω*, otherwise it means *on, at, upon, against*. This

also points to the coining of the compound. Taking all these facts into consideration, there need be no hesitancy in calling this a coined compound.

26. arbinumja= κληρονόμος. That Ulfilas should use such a compound as arbi-numja *heir* is, at all events, very strange. It occurs only three times, Mk. 12:7, Lu. 20:14, Gal. 4:1, and translates κληρο-νόμος *heir*. Arbi is the common word for *inheritance*, and *numja *taker* is from niman *take*. The Greek uses compounds of κληρο-νομ- in every idea of inherit, e. g., *heir* κληρονόμος *lot taker*, κληρο-νομία *inheritance*, i. e., *lot taking*, *inherit* κληρονομέω, i. e., *take one's lot*. But the Gothic uses the neuter noun arbi *inheritance* without exception to translate κληρο-νομία, and has the phrase arbja waírþan *inherit*. The regular noun for *heir* is arbja, and translates κληρο-νόμος. But, strangely, three times, as mentioned above, Ulfilas felt the need of a stronger term, or had his attention drawn more closely to the form of the Greek word. κληρο-νόμος means literally *lot taker* (κλῆρος *a lot, an allotted portion*, and so practically an *inheritance*), and is reproduced perfectly in arbi-numja. No such compound occurs in any other Germanic dialect, nor in Latin, and the coining is self-evident.

27. miþwissei=συνείδησις. Ulfilas translates συν-είδησις *conscience* by miþ-wissei, six times; also the verb σύν-οιδα by miþ-witan: συν- *with*=miþ- *with* Latin con- (cum) in con-scientia. *εἴδησις from the root *know*, o-grade οἶδα (*ei-, *oi-, *i-) corresponds in meaning to *wissei from witan *know*. So far the correspondence is perfect. But we find in I. Cor. 10:28, 29 þuhtu *thought, wisdom* translating συν-είδησιν *conscience*, otherwise, Col. 2: 23, þuhtaus translating σοφίας *wisdom*.

What is more, ga-hugds *thought, mind, heart, conscience*, translates συν-είδησις twice, otherwise, three times, διά-νοια (διά+νόος *mind*) *thought, mind*. This looks very much as if ga-hugd (ga-collective force, *hugds from hugjan *think*) had been the regular Gothic word in the sense of *conscience*. It at least was a Germanic word, since we find in both OHG. and MHG. gi-hugt, ca-huct, ge-huht *conscience* and many other forms of the same stem.

On the other hand, miþ-wissei seems to be coined in imitation of the Gr. συν-είδησις, and the two cases where þuhtus is used to

translate it to show carelessness on the part of Ulfilas, since in both instances the force needed is not *thought* but *conscience*, and everywhere else, þuhtus means merely *mind, thought*, and not *conscience*.

In the two cases where συν-είδησις is translated by ga-hugd, Ulfilas has used the Gothic word for *conscience* instead of using the miþ-wissei, which he had consciously formed.

The fact that the Modern German uses Ge-wissen *conscience* is no argument against the above theory, the latter is also a coining after the Lat. conscientia (cum-+scientia), dating back to OHG. gi-wizzani, while the English has borrowed *conscience* from the French corruption of the Lat. conscientia.

28. waúrdajiuka=λογομαχία. In I. Tim. 6:4, waúrda-jiukōs translates λογο-μαχίας *strife about words*, waúrd=λογ-, and jiuka *strife*=*μαχία from μάχομαι *fight*. The Greek influence is clearly seen here; the compound occurs nowhere else and is clearly a coined expression.

29. ufwaír=ὕπανδρος. Rom. 7:2, uf-waíra *married* is a unique compound translating ὕπ-ανδρος *married*, uf-=ὑπ-(ὑπό), both in meaning and historically, *under*, IE. (s)up-ó. The second member in Gothic contains the root of waír *man*, and thus corresponds to the Gr. ἀνήρ, generally; the compound then means *under*, or, *subject to a man*. The compound occurs but once in the Gothic remnants, and its very uniqueness is sufficient to stamp it a coined word.

30. silbasiuneis=αὐτόπτης. Lu. 1:2, silba-siunjōs translates αὐτ-όπται (αὐτός *self*+*ὀπτος from ὄπτω *see*) *seeing with one's own eyes, eye-witness*. In the Gothic silba *self*=αὐτός *self*, and *siuneis *one who sees* is from the stem of siuns *sight*, and suffix -ja, *siun-ja from saíhvan *see*.

The influence of the Greek in the formation of the Gothic word is quite evident, and since no other Germanic dialect shows a similar compound, we must, it seems, considering its uniqueness, look upon it as a coined compound.

There is another compound with silba *self*, as the first member, and this, too, occurs but once, II. Cor. 8:3, silba-wiljōs *self-willed*, translating αὐθ-αίρετοι (again silba=αὐτο-, but *wiljis=αἱρετός). *Wiljis *willed*, while αἱρετός from αἱρέομαι *choose*, the

compound αὐθαίρετος meaning, then, *self-chosen*, practically synonymous with *self-willed*. This might also, then, be a coined compound, but we find that the ON. has sjalf-vil *self-will*, and the AS. has self-will *self-will*, and the adj. self-wille *voluntary* as well as self-willende *voluntary* and self-willes *voluntarily*. Now, the Gothic has the noun wilja *will*, and so probably had the adj. *wiljis *willed*, which occurs only in this compound, silba-wiljis, where silba seems to be called forth by the Gr. αὐτο-, as above, and it looks as if this were so, but, taking into consideration the fact that both the ON. and AS. have such a compound, when the Latin does not, makes the compound seem a Germanic one.

31. ibnaskauns=σύμμυρφος. Phil. 3:21, shows ibnaskaun-jamma translating the Gr. σύμ-μορφον *of like appearance or form*. Ibna *like*, Eng. *even*, Ger. *eben*, would correspond nicely to Gr. συμ-(σύν), while skauns *formed*, *well-formed*=*μορφος from μορφή *form*. The compound occurs but once, yet the complete correspondence between the two languages, as well as the meaning, would tend to brand it a coining.

Likewise, guþa-skaunei *the form of God*, occurring in Phil. 2:6, in dat. case guþa-skaunein, and translating the Gr. ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ, is most probably coined. It is true that the correspondence is not as complete as if the Gothic translated such a compound as *θεο-μορφή, still the idea is new and there can be no doubt as to the influence of the Greek phrase upon the formation of the Gothic compound.

In Jo. 9:31, guþ-blōstreis translates θεο σεβής *worshipper of God*. Guþ- *god*+*blōstreis from blōtan *worship* corresponds exactly to θεο- *god*+*σεβης from σέβομαι *worship*. *Blōstreis (blōt-tra-ja-) occurs nowhere else, and yet the Goths must have used the word in connection with their native worship, since Ulfilas could not have formed such a word, for this occasion, to translate *σεβής. It is composed of the root blōt- *sacrifice*+the agent suffix -tra- treated as a -ja stem. (The law that a "t" before another "t" becomes "s" has had its effect here, showing that the word *blōstreis existed in the Gothic vocabulary). When Ulfilas found the Gr. θεο-σεβής he, in order to reproduce it as

faithfully as possible, took his Gothic word and prefixed guþa- to reproduce the force of the Greek θεο-.

When, in I. Tim. 2:10, Ulfilas met the Gr. θεο-σέβ-ειαν *the worship of God*, composed entirely akin to the above Greek compound, he did not try to form a compound like *guþa-blōtinassus, for example, which would have reproduced the Greek compound exactly (blōtinassus *worship*); but he used the infinitive phrase guþ blōtan *worship God*, evidently because the Gothic syntax required an infinitive, the construction being, 'ak þatei gadōb ist qinōm gahaitandeim guþ blōtan . . . .,' translating the Greek 'Αλλ' ὃ πρέπει γυναιξὶν ἐπαγγελλομέναις θεοσέβειαν . . . *But which becometh women professing godliness*. . . .

32. ubil-haban[1] =κακῶς ἔχειν. It seems most probable that the phrases in which Ulfilas translates the idiomatic use of the Gr. ἔχειν by haban are due to imitation, ubil-haban,[1] ubilaba haban *be ill* translate κακῶς ἔχειν. Ubil *evil*, Ger. übel or the adv. ubilaba represent κακῶς and haban *have*, ἔχειν *have*. In Mt. 8:16 ubil-habands[1] translates κακῶς ἔχοντας, and in Mk. 2:17 þai ubilaba habandans, reproduces οἱ κακῶς ἔχοντες *those who are sick*, literally, *those having bad or badly*.

In Mk. 5:23, ἐσχάτως ἔχει *having the extremest*, i. e., *being at the point of death*, is translated by aftumist habaiþ (aftumist *extremest*=ἐσχάτως *extremest*). This is very plainly made in imitation of the Greek.

Mk. 7:6 shows faírra habaiþ sik *having one's self at a distance*, translating πόρρω ἀπέχει. The phraseology here, too, suggests Greek influence; and when, as in I. Tim. 5:25, we meet jah þō aljaleikōs sik habandōna, translating καὶ τὰ ἄλλως ἔχοντα, *and those that are otherwise*, i. e., *those that hold themselves otherwise*, the Greek influence is plainly felt.

33. andalauni. Laun regularly translates μισθός *pay*, χάρις *favor*, ὀψώνιον *recompense*, and mizdō *reward* usually translates μισθός, which is the same word historically. We find also andalauni, in Col. 3:24, translating ἀντ-από-δοσιν *recompense*, (ἀντί *against*, ἀπό-δοσις from ἀποδίδωμι *give back, restore*), so anda- would equal ἀντι- and the idea in laun *reward* would correspond to the idea in ἀπόδοσις *payment*. In II. Cor. 6:13, the same anda-

[1] Massmann, 'ubilhaban.' Balg, 'ubil haban.'

launi translates ἀντι-μισθία. Here, likewise, the correspondence is perfect, ἀντι-=anda-, laun=*μισθία from μισθίος *hired* from μισθός *salary*. But in I. Tim. 5:4, the same compound andalauni translates ἀμοιβάς *recompense*. Of course, as far as the meaning is concerned, the anda-launi reproduces ἀμοιβή, but the formation of the words is entirely different, ἀμοιβή coming from ἀμείβω *change*, *exchange*, *avenge*, and so *repay*. What is more, AS. shows a compound and-lēan, which, together with the Go. anda-launi, points to Prim. Ger. *and(a)-laun-.

It is very hard to argue against such evidence with any degree of success, and yet it seems that the Gothic word was formed in imitation of the Greek. It might be explained in this way: laun is the common idea *reward*, and translates χάρις *reward*, ὀψωνία *stipend*, and μισθός *salary*, and when Ulfilas saw the words ἀντ-από-δοσις, and ἀντι-μισθία, he felt the force of ἀντι-, and reproduced it in anda-, as very often. And so, whether the compound had existed before or not, the form of the Greek words caused Ulfilas to use it in these two passages. Its use to translate ἀμοιβή does not necessarily argue unconditionally against the theory that the Gothic is a coining. It may be that Ulfilas translated the Collossians and Corinthians before the Epistle of Timothy and remembered the strengthened form anda-laun- used here, and feeling the need of such a strengthened form for ἀμοιβή *mutual change*, used anda-launi in this passage. This is merely hypothetical, proves nothing, and the facts in the case are strongly against the assumption of coining.

34. harduhaírtei=σκληροκαρδία. In Mk. 10:5, the expression for *hard-heartedness*, hardu-haírtei, seems very much like a coining after the Greek σκληρο-καρδία. The correspondences are perfect. Not considering the simplicity of the idea, the perfect reproduction of the Greek by the Gothic would stamp this a coining. But there are several other compounds of haírtō *heart*, which do not translate Greek compounds of καρδία heart. For ins ance. hauh-haírts *proud*, translates ὑπερ-ή-φανος *proud*. The Gothic means, literally, *high-hearted*, while the Greek ὑπερ- has the same meaning as hauh-, i. e., *high*, or rather *over*, *superior*, but -φανια is from φαίνομαι *appear*, *seem*, the meaning of the compound being, then, *seeming to oneself superior*, and thus the

meaning of the Greek would practically be found in the Gothic, but the Gothic is independent in form, and could not have been made in imitation of the Greek model. Furthermore, hauh-haírts, Tit. 1:7, translates ἀνθάδη *self-pleasing, arrogant,* from αὐτός *self,* and ἥδομαι *please.* Here, too, the meanings correspond, but nothing in the Greek form could have been used as a model upon which to build a new Gothic compound.

We can compare further, I. Tim. 6:4, hauh-þuhts *proud, high, minded,* translating no such compound, but *swelled up* (τύφομαι, *being swelled up with pride*). The meaning here also is reproduced in the Gothic uf-baul-jan, *puff up,* which translates τύφομαι, II. Tim. 3:4. The same correspondence is shown when Ulfilas translates φυσιοῦμαι *being swelled ub,* from φῦσα *a pair of bellows,* by uf-blēsan *blow up,* cf. Modern Ger. 'auf-geblasen sein,' Eng. *to be puffed up over a thing.*

Another compound of haírt- is arma-haírtiþa *pity,* translating ἐλεημοσύνη, yet is in all probabilities, coined after the Lat. miser-i-cordia.

Considering the discrepancies shown in the above translations it seems as if the Gothic had several compounds of *heart* to express one's mental state, and so the perfect correspondence between hardu-haírtei and σκληρο-καρδία may be a coincidence, the occurrence of the word in this passage, in the Greek, calling forth the identical Gothic compound. And yet there seems to be more than that in such a coincidence, but we can not prove whether the word existed before this or not, since it occurs only this once. We say one is *hard-hearted,* or has a *hard heart,* a *heart of stone,* etc., the German also has the expression 'hart-herzig.' Was the idea copied after the Greek and Latin, or was it a Germanic conception also?

35. gaqumþs=συναγωγή. The various Gothic words for a *meeting* are interesting. In the first place, we find that the Greek has συν-αγωγή, *synagogue* (σύν *together,* and ἄγω *lead,* therefore, *leading the people together*). Now, the Latin borrows this, as does the English, in speaking of the *Jewish synagogue.*

We find that in twelve of the seventeen passages, where the Greek uses συναγωγή, Ulfilas borrows the word, while in the remaining five he uses gaqumþs, *assembly* (ga- collective prefix+

*qumþs, from qiman *come*). Besides, gaqumþs translates once, συν-εδρίον, Lat. con-cilium, *large assembly*, also translated twice by gafaúrds, from ga-+*faúrds, allied to faran, *go, fare*. The word ἀγορά is translated by ga-runs, from ga-rinnan, *run together, gather together*, which also translates ῥύμα, really a street or lane, (corresponding to our street-corner crowds, perhaps). συμ-βούλιον *council, counsel* (σύν *together*+βουλεύω, *give advice*; cf. σύμ-βουλος, *advisor*), is regularly translated by ga-rūni (ga-+*rūnan, *whisper, deliberate*).

Although the Gr. συναγωγή is most usually borrowed in the form of synagog- (nominative is not found), when it is not borrowed, it is translated by gaqumþs. And so it looks as if this was the regular word of the Goths to express their religious gatherings, or place of gathering. This view seems safer than to say that the word was coined after συν-αγωγή. It is true ga- translates συν-, and that the second member corresponds, in general, in both languages; yet *qumþs means a *coming*, while *ἀγωγη means a leading, ἄγω, *lead*. Now, if the correspondence were complete we should find a compound of ga-, with the root of lisan, *collect*, for we find that ga-lisan regularly translates συν-άγω, the simple verb lisan even translating συν-άγω and also συλ-λέγω (σύν, *together*+λέγω *gather*). We have compounds of *qumþs in Modern German, in the form of the suffix -kunft, Her-kunft *origin*, Zu-kunft *future*, An-kunft *arrival*, etc., but no *Ge-kunft as we might expect to find, since the Old High German had a noun ka-quimi, ka-quemi, as well as a verb ka-quëman, *come*. The compound ga-+*come*, died out in the Old High German where the force of ga- seems already to have been lost, no traces being found in Middle High German or Modern German.

*Qumþs, of course, could not have been formed by Ulfilas for the occasion, but comes from IE. -gʷm̥-tí-, Lat. -ven-ti-, as in con-ven-ti-ō; therefore the Goths had a word *qumþs, meaning a *coming*, found only in this one compound ga-qumþs. But they surely used it in more compounds than this, cf. the Ger. An-kunft, Her-kunft, Zu-kunft, etc., and since the Old High German has the compound ka-quim-i, it looks as if the Goths might have had ga-qumþs, but the Old High German may have been coined in imitation of the Latin con-ven-ti-, and if so, why not the

Gothic in imitation of the Greek? Besides the Gothic verb ga-qiman, *gather, assemble*, regularly translates the Greek συν-αγ-, or σύν with other verbs of motion. It, therefore, is impossible to prove the coining, although one feels the influence in the compound.

If ga-qumþs translated συν-εδρίον oftener, it might be looked upon as a coining after this Greek word, but ga-faúrds is preferred in the latter case, and is probably a native word, since its form *faúrds is not evident enough to be a coined word.

If any of these words are coined, it most probably is ga-rūn-i in imitation of συμ-βούλιον (ga-=συν- *together*, *rūn-an *whisper*, *deliberate*=βουλεύω *counsel*) occurring in this correspondence four times. The correspondence is perfect, but the Anglo-Saxon has ge-ryne, ge-rene, Old High German and Middle High German ge-rinne, *mystery*, translating the Lat. misterium, and so the compound seems to be a Germanic one.

To sum up all the possibilities of the above words, it seems as if the Goths used ga- with verbs of motion, in the sense of collecting, and it is impossible to tell, from the examples, which were used to express the Gothic *meeting*. They may all be native words.

THE USES OF DUM, DONEC, AND QUOAD IN LIVY

BY C. R. JEFFORDS

The purpose of the following article is to enumerate, classify, and discuss the clauses introduced by *dum*, *donec*, and *quoad* in the extant books of Livy's Roman History.

The discussion will necessarily touch only the most prominent points, as the broad scope of the subject precludes the consideration of many minor details.

The classification, while in some ways unsatisfactory to the writer, seems to him to effect a clearer differentiation than is afforded in the traditional division by tenses.

In the enumeration, which is, to be sure, little more than mechanical work, all extremely doubtful readings have been excluded, and an endeavor has been made to give, in the case of variants, the reading most consistent with Livian style and diction.

In the investigation of the function of *dum-*, *donec-*, and *quoad-*clauses, the etymology of these introductory words plays no insignificant part, since thru it alone are the original usages to be found and the foundation established for the study of developed meanings and functions.

Dom, *donec*, and *quoad* are generally called by grammarians subordinate temporal conjunctions. *Donec* and *quoad* are in reality compounds of a preposition and a relative pronoun, and are conjunctive thru their pronominal nature. *Dum*, which is the oldest of the three, was probably a demonstrative pronoun originaliy, and has become conjunctive in the change from parataxis to hypotaxis.

Quoad is simply a compound of the prepositional adverb *ad*, and the locative adverb *quo*, from the relative stem *qu-*, and is found several times in the form *adquo*, used only in a locative sense. As *quo-ad* is a later development than *donec* and shows more clearly the pronominal element, it is not confined to a strictly temporal use, but denotes extension of both time and

space. The radical meaning "to what extent" is apparent in all cases and varies only in being used to denote both limit and co-extension, that is, to mean both "until" and "as long as" or "as far as."

Dum is generally considered to be a case form of the demonstrative stem **de/o*, found in Sanskrit *ya-da*, *ka-da*, *ta-da*, Greek δή, ἤδη, ὅδε, Latin *tandem*, *quamde*, etc.

Whether *dum* is an accusative or an instrumental form can not be determined, but its original meaning was evidently "at that (time)" or "during that (time)," giving the secondary meanings "while, "as long as," and "until." The original meaning is shown in Plautus' Trinummus 1, 2, 109: *circumspice dum te*—"look around you awhile," and in Catullus, 62.45: *Sic virgo dum intacta manet, dum cara suis est*—"So the maiden, the while she remains unwedded, then is dear to her people."

As *dum* in its original demonstrative function occurred only in parataxis, the examples of it as a demonstrative are not common, tho by no means rare. The intensive use of *dum*, so common in comedy, shows a trace of this demonstrative origin, as in the example quoted above from Plautus. Other examples show less temporal force, as Rudens, 3, 5, 5, *et seq. tange dum . . . . age dum . . . . jube dum.*

The next step in the development is a construction almost on the dividing line between parataxis and hypotaxis, the use of *dum . . . . dum* in the sense of *alias . . . . alias*, Mercator, 2, 3, 14: *Dum servi mei perplacet mihi consilium, dum rursum haud placet.* Closely allied to this construction is the use of *dum* correlating with *tum*, Truc. 2, 1, 33: *Dum habeat, tum amet.*

In the last two examples we see the transition from parataxis to hypotaxis—from the substantive use to the conjunctive use of *dum*—from the meaning "a while" or "the while" to simply "while." The last sentence quoted might be rendered in parataxis as *dum habeat; tum amet.* "He will (is to) have something a while; then (so long) let him love." The extreme hypotactic form would be *amet dum habeat.*

We find, furthermore, that *dum* denoted, as many other words do, both location and extension, i. e., both "in that time" and "during that time"—the latter probably developed from the

former, as a line from a point. *Dum* meaning "while (at the time)" with verbs denoting a point of time, or rest, would naturally be extended in use to verbs denoting duration of time, or motion, and so gain the meaning "while (as long as)."

From "as long as" to "until" is a somewhat longer step, but intermediate stages are not lacking. We find in early Latin after *exspecto* and similar verbs a *dum*-clause with the present indicative. Many writers, Hale[1] among them, translate the conjunction in such cases "until," and explain the form of the verb by saying that it represents an archaic use of the present indicative "in which it expressed almost any modal or temporal idea." Such ambiguity is hardly acceptable as an explanation, and a close study of the uses of *dum* will show that no such indefiniteness existed in the constructions referred to. A typical example of these clauses is found in Eunuchus 1, 2, 126: *Concedam hinc intro atque expectabo dum venit.* This represents in hypotactic form two paratactic sentences—*expectabo dum; venit.* "I shall wait a while; he is coming," i. e., "I shall wait while he is coming." This is a perfectly logical explanation of the construction and is consistent with the origin and development of the conjunction. Of course, as far as meaning is concerned, it is immaterial whether we translate "while he is coming" or "until he comes," but to explain the development of the clause and the form of the verb it is necessary to adhere to the etymological meaning of the conjunction. A more advanced and somewhat different example of the same construction is seen in Andria 2, 1, 29: *Aliquot dies profer dum proficiscor aliquo.*

The next and final stage in the development is the common use of *dum* (until) with the subjunctive. An interesting example of a similar development in English is found in Macbeth III, 1, 143: "While then, God be with you."

Few Latin words have occasioned among philologists more controversy than has *donec*. All possible, and some almost impos-

[1] Hale, *Anticipatory Subjunctive*, pp. 66, 72, and footnotes on 72 and 91. It is doubtful, in most cases, whether the present indicative "is actually found to be fulfilling the function of a future indicative," *without any present tense idea.* In the commonly cited Germanic examples such as "I am going home to-morrow," the idea of futurity is wholly in the adverbial expression "to-morrow," relatively to which the verb is *purely present tense.*

sible, theories have been advanced to account for its forms and functions. It is found in all periods of Latin literature, has the forms *donicum* and *donique*, and the meanings "while," "as long as," and "until." In the endeavor to reconcile these variations and to arrange them in a logical sequence "a whole literature has sprung up."[1]

The most comprehensive and consistent discussion of *donec* is that given by A. Zimmermann in *Archiv für Lateinische Lexikographie* V, 567–71. The essential difference between the view of Zimmermann and those of Schmalz and Persson is that the former considers the syllable *do* derived, not from the demonstrative stem **de/o*, as in the case of *dum*, but from the preposition **do*, found in Latin in the old forms *endo*, *indu*, Greek οἴκαδε, χαμᾶζε, Lettic *da*, Anglo-Saxon *tô*, Old High German *zuo*, New High German *zu*, and English "*to*." *Ne* he takes to be the asseverative particle, shown in *pone* (*pos-ne*) *superne*, *quandone;* and *cum*, a relative form either accusative or locative. According to this etymology the original form was *donicum*, meaning "to what time," "till when," or "until." The form *donec*, which is later than *donicum* and earlier than *donique*, Zimmermann considers due to the spelling *donecum*, which was taken to be *donec cum*, and then dropped the last syllable, just as in English "till" stands for "till when." From *donec*, **doneque* and *donique* arise by analogy with *nec*, *neque*.

It is a significant fact that *donec* and *quoad*, which are very similar in functions, are also, according to Mr. Zimmermann's conception of *donec*, almost identical in original meaning, *do* or *done* corresponding to *ad*, and *quo* and *cum* being practically the same. To this equality in function and meaning is probably due the fact that *donec* and *quoad* are seldom both used freely by the same writer, but one becomes a favorite and the other seems to be avoided. Tacitus shows especial affection for *donec*, while Apuleius favors *quoad*. In the whole of Cicero's writings *donec* occurs but 4 times, while *quoad* is used 143 times. Livy, on the other hand, furnishes 129 examples of

[1] Hale, *Anticipatory Subjunctive*, p. 69, Schmalz *Latin Grammar*, sec. 277. Per Persson, *Indg. Forsch*, II, 218. Brugmann, IV, 610. Corssen, *Aussprache, Beiträge, Nachträge*; index.

donec and but 49 of *quoad*. No invariable distinction can be made between the use of *dum*, *donec*, and *quoad*. Tacitus furnishes a striking example (*Annals* 6, 51) in which the meaning "as long as" is expressed successively by *quoad*, *donec*, an ablative absolute, and *dum*.

In the investigation of the anticipatory subjunctive (or any other subjunctive) much trouble is caused by the heterogeneous nature of the Latin subjunctive.[1] The blending of volitive, optative, ideal certainty, potential, and anticipatory forces with the common element of futurity furnishes a fundamental ambiguity which is increased by the confusion of the periphrastic future, the subjunctive future, and the future (or anticipatory) subjunctive. On account of the subjunctive origin and nature of expressions of futurity, certain constructions, after the differentiation of future indicative and subjunctive, wavered between the two. This vacillation appears alike in Greek and Latin, and thruout the literature of both there is evident a gradual substitution of the (so-called) future indicative for the anticipatory subjunctive. One should remember, however, that this tendency does not indicate a change or development of the meaning of the anticipatory clause, but is simply a recognition of the fact that the subjunctive in these clauses is merely an expression of futurity, and consequently should be distinguished from the volitive, optative, potential, and ideal certainty subjunctives.

In the following classification the anticipatory subjunctive and the future indicative are treated as equivalent expressions of futurity, and it is immaterial whether we consider the future a new form of anticipatory subjunctive, or the subjunctive an archaic future.

Dum, *donec*, and *quoad* differ from the other temporal conjunctions in that they *always* connect clauses *temporally coincident*. This coincidence may be *complete* (C), *partial* (P), or *terminal* (T).

In C, the temporal clause marks the time *thruout* which the action of the main verb extends, and the conjunction means "*as long as*."

[1] See Hale's *Anticipatory Subjunctive*, p. 6 *et seqq*.

In P, the temporal clause states a time *within* which the action of the main verb occurs, and the conjunction means "*while*."

In T, the temporal clause denotes a point of time *up to* which the action of the main verb extends, and the conjunction means "*until*."

Furthermore, the temporal clause may denote an act or state *anticipated* (A), or *non-anticipatory* (N). Thus six clearly marked classes are formed, CN, PN, TN, CA, PA, and TA, each of which may be further subdivided according to the tense and mood of the verb in the temporal clause.

In addition to these six classes, we find with *dum* a volitive expression stating a condition upon which the action of the main verb is dependent. This is commonly called a proviso clause, and will be designated here as "*dum* V."

DUM C N. *Present Indicative.* Twenty-eight examples[1] of this clause are found in Livy. The tense of the main verb is regularly perfect, tho the present is sometimes found when the temporal clause has a causal force. The main verb is not used in tenses other than the present and perfect. A typical example of this class is found in 4, 5, 13: *Ergo dum* (as long as) *nullum fastiditur genus, in quo eniteret virtus, creavit imperium Romanum.*

The blending of causal and temporal force so common in *cum* clauses is also quite marked in several examples of this class, and is well shown in the following, 26, 13, 14: *Cruciatus contumeliasque quas parat hostis dum* (as long as, since) *liber, dum mei potens sum, effugere morte . . . . possum.*

Imperfect Indicative.—The imperfect indicative is used in this construction eleven times. The main verb is regularly perfect indicative, tho one instance is found of the imperfect (30, 11, 8) and two of the historical infinitive (35, 31, 1, and 36, 19, 2). One example is found of the *imperfect subjunctive* in indirect discourse (25, 20, 6).

DUM PN. By far the most common of the temporal clauses under consideration is the non-anticipatory clause introduced by *dum*, meaning "while." Altho *donec* and *quoad* do not occur with

[1] It has seemed best to omit the complete lists of examples given in the thesis originally, and to quote only typical clauses for illustration.

this construction, these clauses alone amount to more than three-eighths of the sum total. The verb in the temporal clause is usually present indicative, altho the imperfect, perfect, and pluperfect indicative also occur, and the present, imperfect, and pluperfect subjunctive. Of 193 examples noted, 146 are present indicative.

Noticeable in this class is the stock phrase *dum haec geruntur*. It is found usually at the head of a chapter, forming the transition from one scene to another, and means little more than *interea* or *interim*. The main verb is usually present or perfect, less often imperfect or pluperfect. The causal force noted in *dum* CN is occasionally found here also.

No definite distinction can be made between the present, imperfect, and perfect indicative in this construction. We find *dum haec Veis agebantur* (5, 47, 1) and *dum haec in Apulis gerebantur* (10, 36, 16) exactly parallel with instances of *dum haec aguntur* and *dum haec geruntur*.

In these clauses *dum* with the present indicative is almost synonymous with *cum* with the imperfect subjunctive (cf. 33, 36, 1; 42, 64, 51; 45, 11, 1), the chief distinction being that *cum* is used more when the principal predicate is preterit, *dum* when it is present or future. We find many places in Livy (7, 16, 2; 22, 14, 12; 23, 20, 5; 39, 38, 1; 45, 34, 10) *cum* where one would expect *dum*, and one is led to suspect that a critical examination of the manuscripts might bring some revelations.

One instance of *dum* with the *pluperfect indicative* is found, (probably the only example of the kind in classical prose, since *dum erat occupatus*, Cicero Pro Sex. Ros. 91 is not a parallel case): *dum in unam partem oculos animosque hostium certamen averterat, pluribus locis scalis capitur murus;* 32, 24, 5. It seems probable that Livy wrote *avertebat* instead of *averterat*, since the imperfect is found in the preceding and following sentences. The fundamental meaning of *dum*, as well as of *donec* and *quoad*, precludes the occurrence of a clear pluperfect indicative, since these conjunctions denote temporal coincidence, and can not, like *cum*, connect two clauses entirely separated in time. If *averterat* is the correct reading in the above clause, it must be considered equivalent to *aversos tenebat*.

DUM PN with the *present subjunctive* occurs seven times in Livy. The examples are all in indirect discourse, and it is by no means an easy task to determine whether they are anticipatory or not—whether PN or PA; but the temporal clause seems to be relatively present, so they have been classed as PN. A typical example is found in 42, 50, 8: (*adfirmabant*) *dum integrae res sint, statuere apud suum animum Persea debere.*

In classifying *dum*-clauses with the *imperfect subjunctive*, the majority of which are in indirect discourse, the same trouble is found as with the present; but a paratactic analysis has generally given a clear differentiation. The distinction between PN and PA is well shown by the following examples: *Nuntium mittunt dum quies nocturna hostes premeret* (while they are [will be] asleep) *ut transirent*, 22, 50, 4. Here the temporal clause looks toward the future, while in the following it does not: *non destitit monere, dum quies esset* (while it is [now] quiet) *ut se ducem sequerentur*, 22, 60, 10.

With these clauses have been included several which have the meaning of a *dum*-"while" clause, but show the imperfect subjunctive where one would expect to find the present indicative. A good example is found in 1, 40, 7: *Dum intentus in eum rex se totus averteret, alter elatam securim in caput dejecit.* In these clauses, *dum* with the present indicative, or *cum* with the imperfect subjunctive, would have been the regular construction; and some grammarians have insisted on reading *cum* for *dum* in all such cases. As the text reads, the subjunctive can be explained only by making it part of some form of implied indirect discourse:[1] There is a slight anticipatory force in all these clauses, and this might occasion the subjunctive, altho we have no firm foundation for establishing such a construction. Since the number of examples is few, it is extremely difficult, and perhaps unadvisable, to formulate any rules governing clauses of this kind.

DUM PN is found once with the *pluperfect subjunctive*, which is really equivalent to an imperfect. *Plebs jussit neve quis eorum, qui Capuae fuisset dum portae clausae essent, in urbe intra certam diem maneret*, 26, 34, 7.

[1] See Fisher's *Latin Grammar*, 673 *et seq.* It is possible that *cum*-clauses have influenced this construction.

Dum "until" with no anticipatory force is not found in Livy. With the exception of three instances with *quoad*, he uses *donec* altogether in this construction.

DUM TA. *Present Subjunctive. Dum* "until" anticipatory is found three times with the present subjunctive, in each instance after *expectare*. The following from 3, 11, 35 illustrates well the type: *expectate dum consul aut dictator fiat.*

The *imperfect subjunctive* with *dum* TA is quite common, occurring more times than with both *donec* and *quoad* together. As it would naturally represent a future idea in a subordinate clause in narration, its predominance over the present is not surprising.

DUM V (Proviso). The proviso clauses are introduced by *dum*, either alone or intensified by *modo* (or *modo* alone may be used), and as far as the translation is concerned are very similar to *dum* CA. But the negative, common in these clauses and not found in the others, is always *ne*, indicating volitive and not anticipatory origin. This fact, however, in no way affects the theory of anticipatory origin for the other clauses, since the volitive force of *dum* proviso clauses can be shown clear and distinct from the *dum* anticipatory category.

By resolving a *dum* V and a *dum* CA clause to the paratactic form, the invariable criterion for determining primitive significance, we find (aside from the temporal particle, which goes then with the main and not the subordinate verb) in the primitive anticipatory clause an anticipatory subjunctive, and in the proviso clause a volitive jussive or imperative.

To illustrate with an example in English, the sentence, "I shall wait while he is writing," made paratactic, would be "I shall wait a while; he is (to be) writing," the latter sentence representing an anticipatory subjunctive. A corresponding use of a proviso clause would be "I shall wait as long as (while, provided that) he does not delay." Paratactic, "I shall wait a while; let him not delay." This analysis shows how the apparent union of a temporal conjunction with a volitive clause is due to the transfer occasioned by hypotaxis. Originally the temporal and volitive expressions were in separate clauses.

The *dum* proviso clause is similar to class CA, except that the temporal clause is stated, not as a fact, but as an assumption or

ideal condition necessary for the establishment of the act or condition expressed by the main verb. It differs from a conditional clause in the very element which allies it to class CA—the meaning "as long as," not necessarily found in a protasis.

Dummodo and *modo* are frequently used to introduce proviso clauses, but, as the temporal element has in such cases almost disappeared, they are not strictly germane to this discussion.

As might be expected, the main verb with proviso clauses is often a jussive or an imperative. A typical proviso clause is found in 29, 34, 7: *Sint vel plures dum talem ducem habeant.* The negative force is shown in 38, 38, 16: *vim vi arcendi jus esto dum ne quam urbem belli jure teneat.*

DUM CA. *Imperfect Subjunctive.* The present subjunctive does not occur with *dum* "as long as" anticipatory. The imperfect is used seven times, all in indirect discourse; 41, 5, 6 furnishes a good example: *Simul decretum ut Ti. Claudius praetor eam provinciam, dum consul inde abesset, tutaretur.*

DUM PA. *Dum* "while" anticipatory is found once with the *future indicative*, 9, 3, 3: *Quo aut qua eamus? num montes molire sede sua paramus, dum haec imminebunt juga, qua tu ad hostem venies?* The strange mixture of moods and tenses in this passage—*eamus*, *paramus*, *venies*—and the uncommon construction with *dum* may be due to the fact that this is a speech made by one of the common soldiers, and Livy has intentionally used a less regular style.

Three examples are found in the *imperfect subjunctive*, all in indirect discourse. The best illustration of the construction has been quoted and discussed already under *dum* PN on page 42.

DONEC CN. *Donec* "as long as" is not found with the present and only once with the *imperfect indicative*, 6, 13, 4: *Donec armati confertique abibant, peditum labor in persequendo fuit.* Livy regularly uses *dum* in clauses of this kind, where duration is emphasized. The idea of limit shown in the etymology of *donec* is apparent in all of the six instances in Livy where it means "as long as." The conjunction shows in each case the force "as long as and no longer than," indicating that the action of the main verb continues merely up to the limit set by the temporal clause. This definite termination does not always

follow with *dum*. *Donec* is used in this construction with the perfect five times—four indicative, and one subjunctive in a purpose clause. According to Lane,[1] *donec* in the sense "all the time while" is found only in poetry and late prose writers. This, together with the fact that Cicero uses *donec* only in the sense "until," its common meaning in Livy, seems to indicate that the meaning "as long as," found commonly in late Latin, is not, as Persson thinks,[2] the original meaning, but a developed and secondary sense.

DONEC TN. *Present Indicative.* *Donec* "until" is so common with the perfect indicative and so rare with the present that the five examples in Livy seem liable to suspicion. In two of them, 4, 26, 7 and 22, 6, 3, the verb is *inquit*, which, altho usually considered present, may be perfect. In one case, 1, 54, 10, the main verb is an historical infinitive, which may account for the present *traditur* with *donec*. In the two other examples, 4, 34, 3 and 7, 26, 5, no satisfactory reason can be found for the use of the present, and one feels inclined to question the text, tho Weissenborn mentions no other readings.

Perfect Indicative. This is the characteristic construction with *donec*, and is relatively as common as *dum* "while" with the present. *Dum* is not used in this construction (TN), and only three instances with *quoad* occur. With *donec* "until" the principal verb is always preterite except in indirect discourse.

With *donec* TN have been included some clauses often classed as "*donec inversum.*" There seems to be little reason for making such an independent construction, since the characteristic of these clauses, as far as they may be said to have a definite characteristic, is simply an ellipsis which is readily supplied from the context. This is well illustrated by 21, 46, 7: *Jam magna ex parte ad pedes pugna venerat, donec Numidiae se ostenderunt.*" "Had become (and so continued) until," etc.

One example occurs of *donec* "until" non-anticipatory with

[1] Lane's *Latin Grammar*, sec. 2002. Since this investigation was begun Lane's *Grammar* has been published, containing a classification of these temporal clauses very similar to the one used here and furnishing some useful suggestions.

[2] *Indg. Forsch*, II, 218. Hale's *Ant. Subj.*, p. 70, and note.

the *pluperfect subjunctive*, 2, 28, 11: *Ibi urguentes inter se cedentibus extremis ab aqua trepidationis aliquantum edebant, donec quietem ipse timor circumspectantibus aquam fecisset.* The indicative would be the regular construction here, and the subjunctive is usually explained as expressing repeated action.

DONEC TA. The number of anticipatory clauses with *donec* "until" is almost the same as the non-anticipatory. The *future perfect*, so common in these clauses in early Latin, has been almost entirely supplanted in Livy by the subjunctive,[1] but one possible instance of the future being found, 25, 12, 6: *Sed neque credes mihi, donec compleris sanguine campum.*

The *present subjunctive* is found nine times, while with *dum* "until" the present subjunctive occurs only twice. This shows again the predominance of the meaning "until" with *donec*. A good example of the anticipatory subjunctive in these clauses is found in 3, 29, 2: *Et tu, L. Munici, donec consularem animum incipias habere, legatus his legionibus praeeris.*

Tho the *imperfect subjunctive* in this construction does not equal the number of instances with *dum*, yet, together with the pluperfect, which does not occur with *dum*, it far exceeds the *dum*-clauses. Since the nature of the conjunction precludes from these clauses a purely pluperfect tense, we find the *pluperfect subjunctive* only in the Oratio Obliqua. It, together with the imperfect, furnishes 45 examples, which differ from the use with the present only in tense.

DONEC CA. Since in the non-anticipatory clauses no examples of *donec* or *quoad* meaning "while" are found, it seems best to include under the meaning "as long as" the few anticipatory *donec-* and *quoad*-clauses which, occurring after a negative, permit either translation. A typical example of this class is found in 6, 14, 10: *Ne quem vestrum, donec quidquam in re mea supereril, judicatum addictumve patiar.* "Never, so long as (while) my resources," etc.

Of the fourteen examples of *donec* CA, two are future, two present subjunctive, and ten imperfect subjunctive. The twelve subjunctive clauses are all in indirect discourse, and nine of

[1] The general tendency in Latin is the other way. See Hale's *Ant. Subj.*, p. 75.

them are dependent on a negative. The most typical example of the class as a whole is found in 22, 39, 10: *Eadem ratio, donec res eaedem manebunt, immutabilis est.*

21, 28, 10 is classed here as an instance of the anticipatory subjunctive. This is the opinion of several editors of Livy, altho almost an equal number class this as an iterative subjunctive, the same as 21, 28, 11. The example in question reads as follows: *Nihil sane trepidabant, donec continente velut ponte agerentur.* Livy is describing here the method used in transporting the elephants across the Rhone. In Lord's Livy the following note is given on this passage: "*agerentur* . . . . " 'whenever they were taken,' or perhaps it refers to the feeling of the elephants, 'as long as they felt,' etc., the subjunctive with *donec* expressing an iterative or perhaps causal idea." The editor seems to waver between the iterative and anticipatory idea. The latter rendering seems more consistent here, "as long as they saw they were to be," etc.

QUOAD, tho quite common in Cicero's works, is comparatively rare in Livy, occurring altogether only 49 times. Almost a third of these are *quoad* CN (as long as) with the perfect indicative. About one-fifth are *quoad* CA, and the rest are scattered out by ones and twos among the other constructions.

In many clauses *quoad* has still its primitive relative force, and so is not confined strictly to a temporal antecedent, but often refers to distance. This is a perfectly natural characteristic, and marks emphatically the etymological distinction between *quoad* and *donec*, or rather, the different lines of development followed by the relatives *quo* and *cum*. By gradual differentiation the former, when without a definite antecedent, generally has a locative meaning, while the latter has a strongly marked temporal force. Consequently the conjunction *quoad* introduces clauses whose determinative element may be either temporal or locative, while *donec*, representing **done-cum*, or *donec-cum*, is restricted to a temporal meaning.

QUOAD CN. With the *present indicative quoad* occurs only once, in 22, 6, 6: *Pars magna per prima vada paludis in aquam progressi quoad capitibus umerisve extare possunt sese immergunt.* The locative force of the conjunction is very marked here, altho

it shows, as such clauses must necessarily do, a slight temporal element.

The *imperfect indicative* is used twice, 1, 18, 8 and 23, 42, 2, the former with *quoad* "as far as" and the latter with *quoad* "as long as." 1, 18, 8: *Signum contra, quoad longissime conspectum oculi ferebant, animo finivit.* 23, 42, 2: *Hostes populi Romani fuimus, quoad nostra arma, nostrae vires nos tutare poterant.*

Of the fifteen examples of *quoad* with the *perfect indicative* twelve are CN and three TN. The former is the regular construction with this conjunction, while the latter is comparatively rare and encroaches on the ground usually covered by *donec.* A characteristic example showing a blending of locative and temporal force is found in 37, 20, 14: *Diophanes secutus quoad tutum fuit, in praesidium redit.*

The *present subjunctive* is found once, 5, 51, 2, and the *perfect subjunctive* twice, 10, 24, 8 and 34, 48, 1, all in indirect discourse. According to Weissenborn, who follows Mommsen's reading, the *pluperfect subjunctive* is found in 5, 50, 2, altho the manuscripts give *quod* here instead of *quoad*, and furthermore the pluperfect is not found elsewhere with this construction in Livy.

QUOAD TN. *Quoad* "until" non-anticipatory is found three times, 23, 26, 2; 26, 46, 10; and 30, 30, 30, all with the perfect indicative. These are the only examples in Livy in which the meaning "until" non-anticipatory is not expressed by *donec.* This use of *quoad* seems to be further evidence of the close relation between the original meanings of *donec* and *quoad.* The similarity may be seen by comparing 26, 46, 10—*quoad arx dedita est, caedes factae sunt*—with 4, 33, 3—*nec minor caedes in urbe quam in proelio fuit, donec . . . dictatori deduntur.*

QUOAD TA. *Quoad* "until" anticipatory occurs eight times, once with the *imperfect*, twice with the *perfect*, and five times with the *pluperfect subjunctive*, the last all *sub obliqua.* These eight clauses differ only in tense, and 24, 38, 6 furnishes a typical example: *Ego in contione ero et tempus quoad omnia instructa sint, loquendo altercandoque traham.*

QUOAD CA. *Quoad* "as long as" anticipatory is found nineteen times—four with the *future*, three with the *present subjunctive*, ten with the *imperfect*, and two with the *pluperfect sub-*

junctive. All the subjunctive clauses are in indirect discourse; and when the temporal clause is future indicative, the main verb is also future. This class is well exemplified by 40, 15, 17: *Quoad tecum illis pax manebit, mecum quoque gratia erit.* The corresponding subjunctive construction appears in 38, 20, 7: *Quoad loca patiantur, subire jubet.* The latter shows a slight locative as well as temporal force.

On pages 52 and 53 will be found several tables presenting a brief numerical synopsis of the results of the classification. A glance at these figures shows not only that Livy was not careless and inaccurate in the use of words, but also that his use of *dum*, *donec*, and *quoad* was quite exact and discriminating.

Of the 303 examples of *dum*-clauses, 15 per cent denote complete coincidence in time, 65 per cent partial coincidence, and 13 per cent terminal coincidence. A little over 6 per cent are proviso clauses.

With *donec* we find 129 examples, of which 16 per cent denote complete and 84 per cent terminal coincidence.

Quoad furnishes 49 examples, of which 77 per cent are complete and 23 per cent terminal.

These figures show clearly that the common meaning of *dum* is "while," of *donec* "until," and of *quoad* "as long as."

Altogether 481 clauses are classified—63 per cent *dum*, 27 per cent *donec*, and 10 per cent *quoad*.

Looking at them from another standpoint, we find that of the 105 "as long as" clauses, 45 per cent are introduced by *dum*, 19 per cent by *donec*, and 36 per cent by *quoad*. Comparing these figures with the preceding percentage of the total, we find, by combining the two results, that the relative use of *dum*, *donec*, and *quoad* to mean "as long as" is *dum* 14 per cent, *donec* 14 per cent, and *quoad* seventy-two per cent. This does not mean that *quoad*-clauses constitute 72 per cent of the "as long as" clauses in Livy—they really form but 36 per cent—but simply shows that since *quoad*-clauses, which are but 10 per cent of the total, furnish 36 per cent of the "as long as" clauses, while *dum*, 63 per cent, give but 45 per cent "as long as," and *donec*, 27 per cent, 19 per cent "as long as" clauses, the relative

strength of the meaning "as long as" is in *dum* 14 per cent, *donec* 14 per cent, and *quoad* 72 per cent.

Of 159 "until" clauses, 25 per cent are introduced by *dum*, 68 per cent by *donec*, and 7 per cent by *quoad*. In the same way as before we find that the relative strength of the meaning "until" is with *dum* 11 per cent, with *donec* 70 per cent, and with *quoad* 19 per cent.

The meaning "while" is found only with *dum*. This is no doubt due to the fact that *dum* alone is of demonstrative origin, and consequently fitted for the meaning "at that very time." This readily develops into the meaning "during that very time," and finally into "to the end of that very time," or "until."

On the other hand, altho *donec* and *quoad*, with the original meaning "until," naturally attain the meaning "as long as," they are never found in the sense of "while." A point may develop into a line, but a line does not develop into a point.

Probably the most important result gained from the study of these temporal clauses in Livy, and the necessarily concomitant consideration of earlier and later usages, is the light thrown upon the etymology of *donec*. Mention has been made of the various theories on this subject proposed and supported by different scholars. The fact that these theories differ radically, while each is upheld by scholars of a world-wide reputation, makes the subject unusually interesting, and at the same time discourages positive assertions without evident proofs; from the material at hand, however, and from a study of the phenomena exhibited by the language in various periods, it seems safe to posit the following conclusions:

1. *Donicum* is the oldest form, *donec* next, and *doneque* and *donique* the last developments.[1]

2. The meaning "as long as" is not found with any form of *donec* before Lucretius and Livy.[2]

3. *Donec* is very closely related in use and construction to *quoad*, whose original meaning was undoubtedly "to what extent" or "until." *Quoad* and *donec* are both used to introduce a ter-

[1] See Charisius, Keil I, p. 178 and p. 227, l. 18; Festus, p. 347.

[2] Lane, sec. 2002; Fischer, p. 674, obs. 6; Freund's(Harper) *Latin Lexicon*, etc.

minal non-anticipatory clause, which (in Livy, at least) is never introduced by *dum*.

4. "While," the most common meaning of *dum*, and an immediate predecessor of the meaning "as long as," is never found with *donec* or *quoad*.

5. The development of the meanings "as long as" and "until" from "while" is perfectly natural, and can be traced thru all the literature; but no evidence can be found of "while" derived from "until."

These facts all corroborate the theory that *donec* is derived from *donicum* (**doneccum*), made up of a preposition, an asseverative particle, and a relative, and meaning originally "until." No confirmation can be found for Per Persson's theory (nor does Professor Hale, in accepting it, suggest any), and unless further evidence is given in its favor, we must conclude that it is a mere conjecture, unsupported by an adequate knowledge or a careful investigation of the subject.

DUM

	INDICATIVE						SUBJUNCTIVE				Total
	Pres.	Imp.	Fut.	Perf.	Plup.	Fu. P.	Pres.	Imp.	Perf.	Plup.	
CN	28	11	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	.....	.....	40
PN	146	8	.....	6	1	.....	7	25	.....	1	194
T	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	3	36	.....	.....	39
V	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	7	12	.....	.....	19
CA	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	7	.....	.....	7
PA	.....	.....	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	3	.....	.....	4

DONEC

	INDICATIVE						SUBJUNCTIVE				Total
	Pres.	Imp.	Fut.	Perf.	Plup.	Fu. P.	Pres.	Imp.	Perf.	Plup.	
CN	.....	1	.....	4	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	.....	6
TN	5	.....	.....	48	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	54
TA	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	9	21	.....	24	55
CA	.....	.....	2	.....	.....	.....	2	10	.....	.....	14

QUOAD

	INDICATIVE						SUBJUNCTIVE				Total
	Pres.	Imp.	Fut.	Perf.	Plup.	Fu. P.	Pres.	Imp.	Perf.	Plup.	
CN	1	2	.....	11	.....	.....	1	.....	3	1	19
TN	.....	.....	.....	3	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	3
TA	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	1	6	8
CA	.....	.....	4	.....	.....	.....	10	2	.....	3	19

NUMBER OF CLAUSES IN EACH CLASS AND PERCENTAGE IT FORMS OF THE WHOLE

NUMBER				PERCENTAGE			
As long as	While	Until	Proviso	As long as	While	Until	Proviso
105	198	159	19	22	41	33	4

NUMBER OF CLAUSES INTRODUCED BY EACH CONJUNCTION AND PERCENTAGE IT FORMS OF THE WHOLE

NUMBER			PERCENTAGE		
Dum	Donec	Quoad	Dum	Donec	Quoad
303	129	49	63	27	10

PERCENTAGE OF RELATIVE FREQUENCE OF DIFFERENT MEANINGS WITH EACH CONJUNCTION, IN PROPORTION TO THE NUMBER OF TIMES IT IS USED

	Dum	Donec	Quoad
As long as	14	14	72
While	100	.....	.....
Until	11	70	19
Proviso	100	.....	.....

PERCENTAGE OF THE WHOLE NUMBER OF EACH CLASS OF CLAUSES INTRODUCED BY EACH CONJUNCTION

	NON-ANTICIPATORY			ANTICIPATORY			TOTAL		
	Dum	Donec	Quoad	Dum	Donec	Quoad	Dum	Donec	Quoad
As long as	38	6	18	7	13	18	45	19	36
While	98	.....	.....	2	.....	.....	100	.....	.....
Until	.....	34	2	25	34	5	25	68	7
Proviso	.....	.....	.....	100	.....	.....	100	.....	.....

PERCENTAGE OF THE WHOLE NUMBER OF CLAUSES WITH EACH CONJUNCTION BELONGING TO EACH CLASS

	NON-ANTICIPATORY			ANTICIPATORY			TOTAL			
	As long as	While	Until	As long as	While	Until	Proviso	As long as	While	Until
Dum	13	64	.....	2	1	13	6	15	65	13
Donec	5	.....	42	11	.....	43	.....	16	.....	84
Quoad	38	.....	6	39	.....	17	.....	77	.....	23

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS PAINE*

BY CLARK EDMUND PERSINGER

Notwithstanding the prominent position it has occupied in democratic thought and argument for the past century, apparently very few attempts have been made to definitely formulate the political philosophy of the Revolutionary period. Of these few, Professor McLaughlin's paper upon "Social Compact and Constitutional Construction"[1] alone offers any general standard by which the philosophy of an individual writer of the day may be even partially measured. His conclusion, drawn chiefly, I am led to believe, from a study of the debates upon the Federal constitution, is: "To the compact philosophy"—the dominant philosophy of the period under consideration—"may be said to belong three ideas . . . : (1) The state is artificial, and founded upon agreement; (2) Law is not the expression of the will of a superior, but obtains its force from consent; a man can indissolubly bind himself; (3) Sovereignty is divisible."[2]

This summary I have ventured to alter and enlarge upon somewhat in order to furnish a more complete standard by which to measure Paine's philosophy. The general principles which I have assigned to the Revolutionary thought are the following: (1) Rights are inherent in man, divinely and inalienably bestowed upon him by his Creator;[3] (2) The origin of the State

* (Abridged) Part I of a three-part thesis presented for the Master's Degree in 1900. Omitted parts are: II. Theory of Government; III. Applied Philosophy—Organization of the Republic.

[1] *American Historical Review*, vol. V (1899–1900), pp. 467–90.

[2] *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, V, 470.

[3] Jefferson (Ford's ed. *Works*), I, 429, 447; Washington (Spark's ed. *Works*), II, 397; John Adams (Adams's ed. *Works*), III, 449, 456, 480; George Mason (Rowland's ed. *Works*), I, 196; also Constitutions of Virginia (1776), Pennsylvania (1776), Vermont (1777), Massachusetts (1780), and New Hampshire (1784).

is in a compact, actual or implied;[4] (3) The purpose or object of the State is two-fold: First, the preservation of unsurrendered natural rights;[5] second, the general welfare of society, or the "public good";[6] (4) Sovereignty is divisible, the individual surrendering a portion to the State in order that he may be made more secure in the enjoyment of that retained;[7] (5) Any encroachment upon the unsurrendered portion of the individual's natural rights vitiates the social compact and gives rise to the individual right of revolution.[8]

With this general outline of the thought of the period, we may with some degree of confidence proceed to the study of Thomas Paine and his views.

[4] Samuel Adams (Peabody, *American Patriotism*, 32–33); Jefferson, I, 429–30, IX, 348; John Adams, IV, 219–20; Washington, X, 69; Rufus King (King's *Life and Cor.*), I, 534, V, 304; also Constitutions of Maryland (1776), New Jersey (1776), Massachusetts (1780), and New Hampshire (1784). The writers and speakers of the day differ very much, however, as to whether the origin of the State lies in the "social" or the "governmental compact."

[5] Jefferson II, 43, 44, VII, 4; John Adams, IV, 219, and Constitution of Massachusetts (1780).

[6] Jefferson, I, 430; John Adams IV, 193, 203–04, 225; Washington, X, 117; George Mason, I, 196; Virginia Bill of Rights (1776), Constitutions of Maryland (1776), Pennsylvania (1776), Vermont (1777), Massachusetts (1780), and New Hampshire (1784).

[7] Samuel Adams (Peabody, 33); Jefferson, V, 89, 206, 254–55; Washington (Elliot's *Debates*, I, 305); Constitution of New Hampshire (1784). Professor McLaughlin's paper contains an especially large number of citations in illustration of this point (*Amer. Hist. Rev.* V, 475–77). To this proposition, however, several of the leading Revolutionary spirits—Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris, and, as we shall find, at times Paine himself—took radical exception, affirming the unity and indivisibility of sovereignty.

[8] Patrick Henry (Henry's *Life*), I, 264; Jefferson, II, 44; John Adams, IV, 219, V, 177; Washington, II, 407; Rufus King, V, 304; Virginia Bill of Rights (1776), Constitutions of Maryland (1776), Pennsylvania (1776), Vermont (1777), Massachusetts (1780), and New Hampshire (1784).

Part I. Theory of the State

I. Rights: their nature and origin

1. *Definition of a "Right."*—Of all the writers of the Revolutionary period, Paine alone attempts the definition of the constantly-used term, "right," of which, in his treatise of 1780 upon the "Public Good," he gives the following detailed explanation:

> As I shall have frequent occasion to mention the word *right*, I wish to be clearly understood in my definition of it. There are various senses in which this term is used, and custom has, in many of them, afforded it an introduction contrary to its true meaning. . . . A right, to be truly so, must be right within itself: yet many things have obtained the name of rights, which are originally founded in wrong. Of this kind are all rights by mere conquest, power or violence. In the cool moments of reflection we are obliged to allow, that the mode by which such a right is obtained, is not the best suited to that spirit of universal justice which ought to preside equally over all mankind. There is something in the establishment of such a right, that we wish to slip over as easily as possible, and say as little about as can be. But in the case of a *right founded in right*, the mind is carried cheerfully into the subject, feels no compunction, suffers no distress, subjects its sensations to no violence, nor sees anything in its way which requires an artificial smoothing.[9]

By this definition the justification of any right would appear to rest upon the conscientious endorsement or approval of the "reason"; but whether by this is meant the collective reason of the nation, or merely the reason of the individual, Paine nowhere states. In view of the fact that (as will be seen later),[10] he asserts the supreme sovereignty of the nation, while yet unwilling to deny that of the individual, it may even be justifiable to conclude that he never clearly determined for himself whether such justification of a "right" rested with the individual or the nation.

2. *The Origin of Rights.*—But having thus made himself, as he assumes, "clearly understood" as to the proper definition of "rights," Paine has no doubts as to their origin and nature. "Man is himself the origin and the evidence of the right," he

[9] *Works*, II, 345. All references are to M. D. Conway's four-volume edition (New York and London, 1895); and in all cases italics, etc., are given only as in the original.

[10] See p. 68 of this paper.

informs us. "It appertains to him in right of his existence, and his person is the title deed." [11] "As . . . it is impossible to discover any origin of rights otherwise than in the origin of man," is his argument in the "First Principles of Government," "it consequently follows, that rights appertain to man in right of his existence only . . . ." [12] "*Men are born, and always continue, free and equal in respect of their rights*," [13] is his emphatic declaration in the "Rights of Man"; and numerous other like expressions might be quoted.[14]

Yet natural rights really exist only so far as they are endorsed or supported by reason. As "there is a strange propensity in mankind to shelter themselves under the sanction of right, however unreasonable that right may be," Paine is led "to show, that the right stands upon no better grounds than the reason," [15] which is, of course, but another way of saying, as in his definition of a "right," that reason is the final determinator of a "right founded in right." [16]

Time, moreover, does not affect the validity of a natural right; "a right which originated to-day is as much a right as if it had the sanction of a thousand years," is his response to the Abbe Raynal.[17] And in his "First Principles of Government" he enlarges upon the same thought:

> The wrong which began a thousand years ago, is as much a wrong as if it began to-day; and the right which originates today, is as much a right as if it had the sanction of a thousand years. Time with respect to principles is an eternal NOW: it has no operation upon them; it changes nothing of their nature and qualities. [18]

In the application of his theory of natural rights, Paine went far beyond the majority of his American contemporaries. Writing in 1775 on the subject of "African Slavery in America," he says of the negroes: "As these people are not convicted of for-

[11] "First Principles of Government," *Works*, III, 265.
[12] *Works*, III, 271.
[13] *Works*, II, 386.
[14] See, for example, II, 452, and III, 262, 275.
[15] *Works*, II, 58.
[16] *Works*, II, 34, 35.
[17] *Works*, II, 122.
[18] *Works*, III, 260.

feiting freedom, they still have a natural, perfect right to it. . . ."[19] Five years later, in the preamble to the Pennsylvania Emancipatory Act, he is still more emphatic:

> It is not for us to enquire why, in the creation of mankind, the inhabitants of the several parts of the earth were distinguished by a difference in feature or complexion. It is sufficient to know that all are the work of the Almighty Hand. . . . He, who placed them in their various situations, hath extended equally his care and protection to all, and . . . it becometh not us to counteract his mercies.[20]

3. *Natural Rights Defined and Enumerated.*—Granting the existence of "natural rights," we may yet ask, How are they to be distinguished? and, Of what do they consist? To our proposed question Paine responds:

> Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right of his existence. Of this kind are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, and also all those rights of acting as an individual for his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights of others.[21]

Summary.—Rights, then, according to Paine's philosophy, have their origin in nature, or, in other words, in God, the Creator of man. They may be distinguished from wrongs parading under the name of rights, by the ease with which the reason accepts or endorses them. They are of equal validity whether claimed early or late in the history of the nation or the life of the individual, and appertain to man in general, without distinction as to race or color. They are, to distinguish them from purely civil rights, those which appertain to man "in right of his existence only," and they may perhaps be broadly classified under the two heads of "intellectual rights"—such as religion—and "liberty," by which latter is meant that freedom of individual action which does not interfere with the similar freedom of others.

II. ORIGIN OF THE STATE

Our author appears to have had very clearly in mind the modern distinction between "nation" (or "people"), "state," and "government," although he made use of the same term to designate both the latter. The "people"—that is, the non-political

[19] *Works*, I, 7.
[20] *Works*, II, 29–30.
[21] "Rights of Man," *Works*, II, 306.

but homogeneous body, acting in concert, when at all, from merely voluntary motives—he calls "society." The politically-organized people or society he designates as the "government," or often, as the "nation." This distinction is clearly brought out in the following passage from one of his earliest writings:

> Some writers have so confounded society with government as to leave little or no distinction between them; whereas they are not only different, but have different origins. Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness *positively* by uniting our affections, the latter *negatively* by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions The first is a patron, the last a punisher. . . . Society in every state is a blessing, but government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one . . .[21]

The same distinction may yet be more clearly shown by a rather lengthy quotation from his introduction to "Common Sense":

> In order to gain a clear and just idea of the design and end of government, let us suppose a small number of persons settled in some sequestered part of the earth, unconnected with the rest; they will then represent the first peopling of any country, or of the world. In this state of natural liberty, society will be their first thought. A thousand motives will excite them thereto; the strength of one man is so unequal to his wants, and his mind so unfitted for perpetual solitude, that he is soon obliged to seek assistance and relief of another, who in his turn requires the same. . . . Thus, necessity, like a gravitating power, would soon form our newly-arrived emigrants into society, the reciprocal blessings of which would supercede and render the obligations of law and government unnecessary while they remained perfectly just to each other; but as nothing but Heaven is impregnable to vice, it will unavoidably happen that in proportion as they surmount the first difficulties of emigration, which bound them together in a common cause, they will begin to relax in their duty and attachment to each other; and this remissness will point out the necessity of establishing some form of government to supply the defect of moral virtue.[22]

Paine thus assumes the original state to be one of extreme individualism; this followed in time by that period of voluntary co-operation which makes of the body of individuals a "society," which will endure just so long as perfect justice prevails; and, finally, the appearance of injustice, causing the necessity for and

[21] "Common Sense" (1776), *Works*, I, 69.
[22] *Works*, I, 69.

the organization of the State, or, as Paine himself terms it, the "government."

That he really distinguishes, however, between the State and the government, is very clearly shown by his subordination of the "government" to the "constitution," by his distinction between "social" and "governmental" compacts, and by his subordination of the "assembly" to the "state." In replying in 1792 to Burke's "Thoughts," he remarks:

> From the want of understanding the difference between a constitution and a government, Dr. Johnson and all writers of his description, have always bewildered themselves. They could not but perceive, that there must necessarily be a *controuling* power existing somewhere, and they placed this power in the discretion of the persons exercising the government, instead of placing it in a constitution formed by the nation . . . The laws which are enacted by governments, controul men only as individuals, but the nation, through its constitution, controuls the whole government, and has a natural ability to do so. The final controuling power, therefore, and the original constituting power, are one and the same power.[23]

And in a discussion of "Constitutions, Governments, and Charters," in 1805, he says:

> A Constitution is the act of the people in their original character of sovereignty. A Government is the creature of the Constitution; it is produced and brought into existence by it. A constitution defines and limits the powers of the Government it creates.[24]

The same distinction is no less clearly shown in his rejection of the "governmental" compact. In the "Rights of Man" he suggests Pennsylvania and the United States as examples of the correct method of instituting government, and adds:

> It may not be improper to observe, that in both these instances, (the one of Pennsylvania, and the other of the United States), there is no such thing as the idea of a compact between the people on one side and the government on the other. The compact was that of the people with each other,

[23] *Works*, II, 436.

[24] *Works*, IV, 467–68. In II, 428: "That men mean distinct and separate things when they speak of constitutions and of governments, is evident; or why are those terms distinctly and separately used? A constitution is not the act of a government, but of a people constituting a government; and government without a constitution is power without a right." And in III, 63: "*A constitution is a thing antecedent to a Government; it is the act of a people creating a Government and giving it powers, and defining the limits and exercises of the power so given.*" Italics as in original.

to produce and constitute a government. To suppose that any government can be a party in a compact with the whole people, is to suppose it to have existence before it can have a right to exist. The only instance in which a compact can take place between the people and those who exercise the government, is, that the people shall pay them, while they chuse to employ them.[25]

The same principle is even more plainly stated in another place:

It has been thought a considerable advance toward establishing the principles of Freedom to say that Government is a compact between those who govern and those who are governed; but this cannot be true, because it is putting the effect before the cause; for as man must have existed before governments exis.ed, there necessarily was a time when governments did not exist, and consequently there could originally exist no governors to form such a compact with.

The fact therefore must be that the *individuals themselves*, each in his own personal and sovereign right, *entered into a compact with each other* to produce a government: and this is the only mode in which governments have a right to arise, and the only principle on which they have a right to exist.[26]

A practical application and further illustration of this theory is to be found in his "Dissertations on Government" in 1786:

The election of new assemblies following each other makes no difference in the nature of the thing. The state is still the same state. The public is still the same body. These do not annually expire though the time of an assembly does. These are new-created every year, nor can they be displaced from their original standing; but are a perpetual, permanent body, always in being and still the same." [27]

1. *The "State" Defined.*—Having thus shown that Paine distinguishes quite clearly in fact, though not in terms, between State and government, we may proceed to his definition of the former, understanding always, of course, that we shall find it expressed in terms of the latter. "*Government,*" he asserts, "*is nothing more than a national association acting on the principles of society.*" [28] What he means by the latter part of this definition is partially explained in another and later statement:

Government is nothing more than a national association; and the object of this association is the good of all, individually as collectively. Every man wishes to pursue his occupation, and to enjoy the fruits of his

[25] *Works*, II, 432.
[26] "Rights of Man," *Works*, II, 309.
[27] *Works*, II, 147.
[28] "Rights of Man," *Works*, II, 411.

labors and the produce of his property in peace and safety, and with the least possible expence. When these things are accomplished, all the objects for which government ought to be established are answered.[29]

The "State," then, if we have not misinterpreted Paine's words, is the politically-organized people or "society." It is unlike "society" in that its members act under legal compulsion and not voluntarily, and it differs from the "government" (which represents it) in being its master, because its creator, and its court of final appeal. All of these attributes will become more evident as we follow Paine in his theory of the origin, object, and functions of the State.

2. *Origin of the State.*—We have already learned that "mutual wants" produced "society," which in its turn, and because of "human wickedness," gave way to the political organization known as "government," or, in modern term, the "State." It is this latter cause Paine emphasizes most strongly: That government is nothing more or less than the result of imperfect civilization, or, as he more often expresses it, of "human wickedness." "The more perfect civilization is," he tells us, "the less occasion has it for government, because the more does it regulate its own affairs, and govern itself . . . "[30] "Government is no farther necessary than to supply the few cases to which society and civilization are not conveniently competent," he adds, and even goes so far as to claim that "instances are not wanting to show, that everything which government can usefully add thereto, has been performed by the common consent of society, without government."[31]

So much with reference to the philosophical, or merely theoretical, origin of the State. But Paine preceded even Burke in the realization that the origin of the State in theory was not its origin in fact. And when he comes to discuss the purely historical origin of actual governments, he finds that origin to be two-fold. In the "old" form and the old world, it began in usurpation and force; in the "new" form and the new world, in an actual or implied social compact. In 1776 he writes of kings:

[29] *Works*, II, 443.
[30] "Rights of Man," *Works*, II, 408.
[31] *Works*, II, 408.

. . . it is more than probable, that, could we take off the dark covering of antiquity and trace them to their first rise, we should find the first of them nothing better than the principal ruffain of some restless gang, whose savage manners or pre-eminence in subtilty obtained him the title of chief among plunderers: and who by increasing in power and extending his depredations, overawed the quiet and defenceless to purchase their safety by frequent contributions.[32]

In 1792 he is even more positive:

It is impossible that such governments as have hitherto existed in the world could have commenced by any other means than a total violation of every principle sacred or moral. The obscurity in which the origin of all the present old governments is buried, implies the iniquity and disgrace with which they began. . . . It could have been no very difficult thing in the early and solitary ages of the world, while the chief employment of men was that of attending flocks and herds, for a banditti of ruffians to overrun a country and lay it under contributions. Their power being thus established, the chief of the band contrived to lose the name of Robber in that of Monarch; and hence the origin of Monarchy and Kings.[33]

And in another essay of the same year he is still more brief and emphatic:

Bands of brigands unite to subvert a country, place it under tribute, seize its lands, enslave its inhabitants. The expedition completed, the chieftain of the robbers adopts the title of monarch or king. Such is the origin of Royalty among all tribes—huntsmen, agriculturists, shepherds.[34]

On the other hand, "When a people agree to form themselves into a republic, . . . it is to be understood that they mutually resolve and pledge themselves to each other . . . to support and maintain this rule of equal justice among them. . . . In this pledge and compact lies the foundation of the republic . . . "[35] This "pledge and compact" he has in his earlier writings[36] already designated as the "social compact," and that it is made by the individual members of the new republic, each for himself, is indicated by his affirmation, when discussing the origin of government, that "in this first parliament every man by natural right will have a seat."[37] That he had

[32] "Common Sense," *Works*, I, 80.
[33] Rights of Man," *Works*, II, 411–12.
[34] "Anti-Monarchical Essay," *Works*, III, 102.
[35] Dissertations on Government," *Works*, II, 138.
[36] "Common Sense" (1776), *Works*, I, 100.
[37] " *Works*, I, 70. See p. 59 of this paper.

definitely in mind the social, and not the governmental, compact, has been already sufficiently shown.[38]

Summary.—Our progress from a "state of nature" to the politically-organized nation, or the "State," is, then, very clearly outlined. First we have individuals in isolation; mutual social and economic wants produce a state of voluntary co-operation known as "society"; injustice and inequality lead to the substitution of the general will for that of the individual, and the surrender of certain rights for the maintenance of others. This action of the general will through enacted laws is the "State," and the process which we have traced is its origin. But this is theoretical and general. When we consider the origin of past or present actual States, we find it in either usurpation and force, or else in an actual or implied social compact. The former is the origin of all the ancient States, and of the majority of those at that time existing in the old world; the latter the origin of the new-world governments or States, and the only true or rational origin of any State.

III. OBJECT OR PURPOSE OF THE STATE

1. *To Supplement Society.*—"Government is no farther necessary," Paine affirmed, "than to supply the few cases to which society and civilization are not conveniently competent."[39] In other words, the first purpose of the State is to supplement "society"—to secure to the individual the enjoyment of certain rights to which his own strength is not competent in a state of nature. The State is to produce an equalization of power which shall correspond to that equality of rights which existed before it was created.

> In a state of nature all men are equal in rights, but they are not equal in power; the weak cannot protect themselves against the strong. This being the case, the institution of civil society is for the purpose of making an equalization of powers that shall be parallel to, and a guarantee of, the equality of rights. The laws of a country, when properly constructed, apply to this purpose. Every man takes the arm of the law for his protection as more effectual than his own.[40]

[38] Pages 60–61.

[39] "Rights of Man," *Works*, II, 407.

[40] "First Principles of Government," *Works*, III, 272.

2. *The Preservation of Natural Rights.*—By this line of reasoning we arrive at the real end or object of the State, which is the maintenance of man's "natural rights, civil and political." "The end of all political association," Paine puts it, "is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man; and these rights," he adds, "are liberty, property, security, and resistance of oppression."[41] This, of course, is the direct object of political association.

3. *The General Welfare or Happiness.*—Indirectly, and chiefly by the preservation of natural rights, is to be attained another end: The happiness of the people. "Whatever the form or constitution of government may be," he asserts, "it ought to have no other object than the *general* happiness."[42] As early as 1776 he commends the statement of Dragonetti, quoting it: "Those men would deserve the gratitude of ages, who would discover a mode of government that contained the greatest sum of individual happiness, with the least national expense."[43] And in replying to Burke in 1792, he declares: "If systems of governments can be introduced less expensive and more productive of general happiness than those which have existed, all attempts to oppose their progress will in the end be fruitless."[44]

The same object—now known, however, as the "public good"—is assigned the State in his "Dissertations on Government":

> The administration of a republic is supposed to be directed by certain fundamental principles of right and justice. . . . This administration is executed by a select number of persons. . . . The *public good* is to be their object. . . . Public good is not a term opposed to the good of individuals; on the contrary it is the good of every individual collected. It is the good of all because it is the good of every one: for as the public body is every individual collected, so the public good is the collected good of those individuals.[45]

And in the "Rights of Man" he explains of what the "public good" really consists:

> Government is nothing more than a national association; and the object of this association is the good of all, as well individually as collectively.

[41] "Rights of Man," *Works*, II, 386. See also III, 128.
[42] "Rights of Man," *Works*, II, 454.
[43] "Common Sense," *Works*, I, 99.
[44] "Rights of Man," *Works*, II, 403.
[45] *Works*, II, 137.

Every man wishes to pursue his occupation, and to enjoy the fruits of his labours and the produce of his property in peace and safety, and with the least possible expense. When these things are accomplished, all the objects for which government ought to be established are answered.[46]

4. *Freedom and Security.*—Perhaps all of these objects of the civil State—the supplementing of society, the equalization of power, the preservation of the natural rights of mankind, the general welfare, the public good—are well embraced within his brief definition of 1776: " . . . here . . . is the design and end of government, viz. Freedom and security."[47] And as security of rights naturally carries with it the enjoyment of freedom, he may even be justified in his final assertion that "security being the true design and end of government, it unanswerably follows that whatever form thereof appears most likely to ensure it to us, with the least expence and the greatest benefit, is preferable to all others."[48]

Summary.—Thus we find the object of the State to be, first the supplementing of "society"; a function which it fulfils by guaranteeing to the individual those rights which are his by nature, but for the preservation of which his individual strength is not always sufficient. Secondly, the object of the State is found in the promotion of the general happiness and welfare of its people. Thirdly, the State should always have in mind the "public good," and by this is meant not the good of the whole without regard to the individual, but, "on the contrary . . . the good of every individual collected . . . the good of all, because it is the good *of every one.*"[49] All these objects may be comprehended within the terms "freedom" and "security"; and as freedom is included within the notion of security, the object of the State may be yet more briefly designated as "security," which thus becomes the "true design and end of government."

[46] *Works*, II, 443.
[47] "Common Sense," *Works*, I, 71.
[48] Same, *Works*, I, 69.
[49] *Works*, II, 137.

IV. LOCATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

1. *Originally in God, the Creator.*—Sovereignty is originally, and in its nature, an attribute of God, the creator. Such is Paine's repeated assertion. Three times in the first number of "The Crisis" does he state this belief. In reply to the King's declaration of his right to bind the colonies "in all cases whatsoever," Paine protests that "so unlimited a power can belong only to God."[50] In criticising the conduct of England toward the Colonies, he concludes with the assertion: "Neither have I so much of the infidel in me, as to suppose that He has relinquished the government of the world . . ."[51] And still later he declares: "I am as confident, as I am that God governs the world, that America will never be happy till she gets clear of foreign dominion."[52]

2. *In Man, by Gift of God.*—Since sovereignty rests ultimately with God, it is from God, and at the time of creation, that man must obtain his "rights" and any claim he may have to authority. If we endeavor to locate sovereignty anywhere short of inheritance through creation, we are in error.

> It is authority against authority all the way, till we come to the divine origin of the rights of man at the creation. Here our enquiries find a resting place, and our reason finds a home. If a dispute about the rights of man had arisen at the distance of a hundred years from the creation, it is to this source of authority they must have referred, and it is to this same source of authority that we must now refer.[53]

3. *A Portion Surrendered by the Individual to the State.*—Sovereignty, then, is originally an attribute of God alone; but through the creation it appertains to man, and so to each individual man,[54] as a natural right. In a state of nature, therefore, sovereignty belongs to the individual, and is the determinator of his "natural rights." He is judge of the extent of his own

[50] *Works*, I, 170.

[51] *Works*, I, 171.

[52] *Works*, I, 175.

[53] "Rights of Man," *Works*, II, 304.

[54] See *Works*, II, 307: "A man, by natural right, has a right to judge in his own cause"; which I interpret as affirming the right of *each* man to judge as to what his own "natural rights" are; and this right is, of course, the real and final test of "sovereignty."

rights, and his actual sovereignty is limited only by his actual power.

> But what availeth it him to judge, if he has not power to redress? He therefore deposits this right in the common stock of society, and takes the arm of society, of which he is a part, in preference and in addition to his own. Society *grants* him nothing. Every man is a proprietor in society, and draws on the capital as a matter of right. . . . From these premises two or three certain conclusions will follow: . . . That civil power properly considered as such is made up of that class of the natural rights of man, which becomes defective in the individual in point of power, and answers not his purpose, but when collected to a focus becomes competent to the purpose of every one. . . . That the power produced from the aggregate of natural rights, imperfect in power in the individual, cannot be applied to invade the natural rights which are retained in the individual . . .[55]

The development of the idea is entirely logical. In a state of nature the individual possesses certain natural or inherent rights, but he does not always possess the ability to maintain them. For the sake of increased security in some of the more important of these rights, he joins with his associates in the creation of the State, to which he surrenders other and less valuable "natural" rights. So far as these surrendered rights are concerned, therefore, the State is absolute sovereign. But it can not make such surrendered rights the grounds for an encroachment upon the unsurrendered ones for whose maintenance it was created. In other words, the State has no authority save that derived from the individual through his surrendered rights; so far as the individual himself is concerned, the State "*grants* him nothing,"[56] and *can* grant him nothing, because he is its creator, its superior, and it derives its authority only from him.

4. *Supreme Sovereignty in the Nation.*—But it is at exactly this point that Paine surprises us by flatly and repeatedly denying that the nation derives its authority from the individual, and asserting that, on the contrary, the nation is the source of all authority, the real seat of sovereignty. In 1786 he writes:

> In republics, such as those established in America, the sovereign power, or the power over which there is no control, and which controls all others, remains where nature placed it—in the people.[57]

[55] "Rights of Man," *Works*, II, 307.

[56] *Works*, II, 307.

[57] "Dissertations on Government," *Works*, II, 133.

In 1791 he joins with other "Friends of Universal Peace" in the declaration: "We know of no authority superior to the whole nation . . . "[58]; and in the same year, in Part I of the "Rights of Man," he more than italicizes the statement: "*The nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any* INDIVIDUAL, *or* ANY BODY OF MEN, *be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it*";[59] having already asserted in a few lines previously that "Sovereignty, as a matter of right, appertains to the nation only, and not to the individual. . ."[60] Finally we learn more at length, from the "Declaration of Rights" of 1793—

> The social guarantee of the rights of man rests on the national sovereignty . . . This sovereignty is one, indivisible, imprescriptible, and inalienable . . . It resides essentially in the whole people, and every citizen has an equal right to unite in its exercise.[61]

A partial and possible, though by no means satisfactory, explanation of this evident contradiction may be suggested by a conjectural analysis of Paine's thought, and would be somewhat after this manner: The object of the State is the good of society, or of the "people" which constitutes the nation. But the good of the nation is the good of its individual members.[62] For this individual good the observance of certain individual "rights" is indispensable. These "rights" can be forfeited only by positive crime or by individual lack of mental strength. If the State withholds or withdraws them for any other reason, it vitiates its own object and forfeits its claim to authority. That is, the real object of the State being the good of the individual, when it works injury to the individual, by the violation of his "natural rights," it is by its own nature destroying its own claim to the obedience of the individual, for it is doing the opposite thing from that which it was brought into being to accomplish.

[58] "Address and Declaration," *Works*, II, 253.

[59] *Works*, II, 386.

[60] *Works*, II, 385.

[61] *Works*, III, 130. This explicit statement of the indivisibility of sovereignty would seem to preclude any attempt to explain Paine's assumption of the supremacy of both individual and State sovereignty by means of the "divided sovereignty" theory of the majority of the Revolutionary writers.

[62] *Works*, II, 137.

It does not help us to assume that in the one case Paine refers to the theoretical, and in the other to the actual, sovereignty; for he expressly states that sovereignty belongs to the nation and not to the individual altogether "as a matter of right,"[63] and not merely as a matter of fact. Nor is the supposition justified that the sovereignty of the individual was his earlier belief, and that of the nation his later one; for the former view was held as late as 1792,[64] while the latter was expressed as early as 1786.[65]

Summary.—The result of our study of Paine's location of the supreme sovereignty is very unsatisfactory, but apparently beyond the hope of more favorable result. We have found the sovereignty to be "one, indivisible, imprescriptible, and inalienable." But we have also found this "indivisible" sovereignty located in two very different and wholly irreconcilable portions of the political organism. It appertains to the individual as a direct inheritance from God, through nature, and never departs from him except as to those minor rights which he surrenders in order to obtain security in the more important ones. And it is definitely stated and understood that the surrendered rights can never be made the basis of an encroachment upon the unsurrendered ones—which constitutes the real and final sovereignty. On the other hand, sovereignty, or "the power over which there is no control, and which controls all others," appertains "as a matter of right" to the nation alone, and only from it can the individual obtain any rights or authority.

V. RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL UNDER THE STATE

1. *An Equal Voice in its Creation.*—First of all rights, naturally, is that of an equal voice in the creation of the State. We have already traced[66] the development of isolated individuals into a society, and then into a State, or politically-organized nation. The latter step we found to be completed by a social compact, made in public meeting or "parliament." "In this first

[63] *Works*, III, 130.
[64] "Rights of Man," *Works*, II, 307.
[65] "Dissertations on Government," *Works*, II, 133.
[66] See p. 59.

parliament" we found that "every man by natural right will have a seat."[67]

> The fact . . . must be that the *individuals themselves*, each in his own personal and sovereign right, *entered into a compact with each other* to produce a government: and this is the only mode in which governments have a right to arise, and the only principle on which they have a right to exist.[68]

The question naturally suggests itself: Who is to decide in case of a disagreement among the creators of the new State? Has the majority any "right" to prevail over the minority? "Some may prefer one way and some another," Paine would respond, "and in all cases, where opinion only and not principle is concerned, the majority of opinions forms the rule for all";[69] and the opinion is defended quite at length:

> In all matters of opinion, the social compact, or the principle by which society is held together, requires that the majority of opinions becomes the rule for the whole, and that the minority yields practical obedience thereto. This is perfectly conformable to the principle of equal rights: for, in the first place, every man has a *right to give an opinion*, but no man has a right that his opinion should *govern the rest*. In the second place it is not supposed to be known beforehand on which side of any question, whether for or against, any man's opinion will fall. He may happen to be in a majority upon some questions, and in a minority upon others; and by the same rule that he expects obedience in one case, he must yield it in the other.[70]

Ten years later he condenses the same argument into a much briefer statement:

> The fundamental principle in representative government is, that *the majority governs;* and as it will be always happening that a man may be in the minority on one question, and in the majority on another, he obeys by the same principle that he rules.[71]

But what constitutes a mere "matter of opinion," and what a "matter of principle," is nowhere explained, and we are left to determine for ourselves in how far the creation of the State falls under either or both of these heads, and as to what extent the will of the majority is to thus prevail.

2. *Natural Right the Basis of Civil Right.*—In all cases, how-

[67] *Works*, II, 309.
[68] "Rights of Man," *Works*, II, 309.
[69] "First Principles of Government," *Works*, III, 276.
[70] *Works*, III, 273.
[71] "Constitutional Reform," *Works*, IV, 465.

ever, the civil rights of the individual have their basis in his unsurrendered natural rights. "Every civil right," to use Paine's language, "has for its foundation some natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and protection . . . every civil right grows out of a natural right; or, in other words, is a natural right exchanged."[72] And again, "every civil right has a natural right for a foundation. . . ."[73]

3. *Civil Rights Defined.*—"Civil rights are those which appertain to man in right of his being a member of society," is the definition given us in the "Rights of Man."[74] These rights are "liberty, equality, security, property,[75] social protection, and resistance to oppression." The majority of them are defined:

> Liberty consists in the right to do whatever is not contrary to the natural right of others. . . . Equality consists in the enjoyment by every one of the same rights. . . . Security consists in the protection accorded by society to every citizen for the preservation of his person, property, rights.[76]

4. *Civil Rights Enumerated.*—As we have already discovered,[77] the individual, in entering upon the civil State, does not surrender all of his natural rights. Paine considers it "easy to distinguish between that class of natural rights which man

[72] "Rights of Man," *Works*, II, 306–7.

[73] "First Principles of Government," *Works*, III, 271.

[74] *Works*, II, 306.

[75] In spite of his repeated classification of "property" among the natural and civil rights of man, Paine did not consider property in land as really such a right. In a treatise on "Agrarian Justice" (*Works*, III, 329–337) in 1797, he claims that "It is a position not to be controverted that the earth, in its natural uncultivated state was, and ever should have continued to be, the common property of the human race. . . . There could be no such thing as landed property originally. Man did not make the earth, and, though he had a natural right to occupy it, he had no right to locate as his property in perpetuity any part of it; neither did the creator of the earth open a land office, from whence the first titles should issue." He even goes so far as to suggest a scheme which should accomplish the gradual reversion to the nation of this land-wealth thus unjustly acquired. For the plan, which is somewhat after the mode of the modern inheritance tax, see his *Works*, III, 331–337.

[76] "Declaration of Rights," *Works*, III, 128–129.

[77] See p. 68.

retains after entering into society and those which he throws into the common stock as a member of society,"[78] and his rule of discrimination is this:

> The natural rights which he retains are all those in which the power to execute is as perfect in the individual as the right itself. . . . The natural rights which are not retained, are all those in which, though the right is perfect in the individual, the power to execute them is defective.[79]

"Among this class" of rights retained in the civil State, and over which the State possesses no sovereignty, "are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind," and "consequently religion is one of those rights."[80]

5. *The Rights of Each Generation Original and Complete.*—One generation cannot usurp the rights of another. Each generation holds its rights in "fee absolute" from nature.[81] Upon this point Paine is very positive.

> As we are not to live forever ourselves, and other generations are to follow us, we have neither the power nor the right to govern them, or to say how they shall govern themselves. It is the summit of human vanity, and shows a covetousness of power beyond the grave, to be dictating to the world to come.[82]

Thus he wrote in 1786. In 1791 he warns the French of the evils of the opposite course:

> Man has no authority over posterity—if he had, our rights would long since have been lost. . . . The rights of man are the rights of all generations. We should not let anxiety for their welfare carry us to the pitch of doubting their capacity. They might be wiser than we are. Let us not therefore be so blind as to usurp a power to which we have no right.[83]

And in 1795 he generalizes upon the subject:

> A single reflection will teach us that our ancestors, like ourselves, were but tenants for life on the great freehold of rights. The fee-absolute was not in them, it is not in us, it belongs to the whole family of man thro' all ages.[84]

[78] "Rights of Man," *Works*, II, 306. [79] *Works*, II, 307.

[80] Same. [81] *Works*, III, 262.

[82] "Dissertations on Government," *Works*, II, 164–65.

[83] "On Legislative and Executive Powers," *Works*, II, 248–49. See also II, 415.

[84] "First Principles of Government," *Works*, III, 262. Paine would make the life of one generation much longer than either one of Jefferson's estimates. He concludes (*Works*, II, 165) that "the time between coming of age, and the natural end of life . . . may be about thirty years; for

6. *Equality of Rights.*—Finally, there must be a perfect equality of rights among the citizens of a State. "Whether the rights of men shall be equal is not a matter of opinion, but of right, and consequently of principle" we find him declaring in the midst of the French Revolution;[85] and we have already discovered "equality" to be one of the natural rights retained in the civil State.

Summary.—Each individual, then, having had an equal voice in the creation of the State, and the minority having yielded to the opinion of the majority, we may briefly summarize our information regarding the rights of the member of such a State. First of all we learn that his civil rights are those appertaining to him "as a member of society," and that every one of such rights is based upon some corresponding natural right. Among these civil rights are included, liberty, equality, security, property, social protection, and resistance to oppression. Further, and in addition to the civil rights based merely on natural rights, there are certain natural rights never surrendered to the civil State. These are those "in which the power to execute is as perfect in the individual as the right itself," and they refer chiefly to the "intellectual rights, or rights of the mind," pre-eminent among which is religion, or freedom of belief. The rights surrendered to the State cannot be made use of for the abrogation of the retained natural rights; nor has the present generation any justification for an attempt to usurp the rights of a later one; for the rights of each generation are original and complete within themselves. Lastly, rights are common and equal to all, not as a matter of opinion, but as a matter of right or principle.

though many may die before, others will live beyond; and the mean time is equally fair for all generations." In 1786, in "Dissertations on Government" (*Works*, II, 165), a practical application of this theory is suggested: "If it was made an article in the constitution, that all laws and acts should cease of themselves in thirty years, and have no legal force beyond that time, it would prevent their becoming too numerous and voluminous, and serve to keep them within view in a compact compass."

[85] "First Principles of Government," *Works*, III, 273.